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Introduction
1.1 The Policy Issues
In 1985, the unemployment rate in the United States was 7.1
percent. There is virtual agreement that unemployment of this magni
tude is a serious problem both for the individuals involved and for
society as a whole. Workers who lose their jobs bear an immediate
financial loss which can be substantial even in the presence of
unemployment insurance. Even after a spell of unemployment is
completed, an individual may continue to feel its economic effects.
Future earnings may be less because of missed opportunities for
on-the-job training and other kinds of investment in "human capital."
From the point of view of the economy as a whole, perhaps the best
way to summarize the impact of unemployment is its cost in foregone
output. In 1985, for example, the difference between actual Gross
National Product and potential Gross National Product was roughly
$110 billion or 2.75 percent of actual GNP. 1 Finally, we should note
that unemployment appears to be related to a number of individual and
social problems whose costs are hard to quantify there is some
evidence, for example, that when unemployment goes up, so do heart
disease, crime, mental illness, and even suicide. 2
This monograph discusses several approaches to the analysis of
unemployment, and public policy to deal with it. The subject is a
complicated one, partially because policy toward unemployment
cannot be formulated in isolation from a number of other important
issues. Three important related topics are:
1. Inflation. If unemployment is such a bad thing, then why can©t
the government simply hire people who are out of work? Alterna
tively, why can©t the government increase the level of aggregate
demand so that private firms will hire more people? As we shall see
below, one of the major controversies in macroeconomics is whether
1
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government spending policies can have any impact on unemployment.
But it is fairly well agreed that a by-product of government spending
policies to decrease unemployment is wage inflation. Hence, one
important issue we address is how to estimate the trade-off between
inflation and unemployment.
2. Taxes. In discussions about unemployment, the subject of tax
policy usually arises in two related but distinct contexts. The first is the
effect of taxes on aggregate demand. For example, does lowering
income taxes induce consumers to spend more, perhaps leading to
more employment? The second is the effect of taxes on aggregate
supply do tax decreases affect the amount of work people want to
do? If so, can the additional labor supply be absorbed by the economy
in a reasonable amount of time? Both of these effects are important and
interesting. However, the primary focus of this essay is on the
workings of the labor market rather than the determinants of aggregate
demand, so we will consider mainly the supply effects of tax changes. 3
3. Unionization. It is usually argued that unions increase unem
ployment by raising wage rates above their equilibrium level. It could
be, however, that the main effect of unions is to reduce the supply of
labor, i.e., to shift back the supply curve. This would have the effect
of decreasing unemployment. Because both effects might be operative,
the outcome is theoretically ambiguous. Indeed, in their very careful
analysis of U.S. employment data, Pencavel and Hartsog (1984) find
that when it comes to the effect of unionism on relative man-hours
worked, the data do not unambiguously point to a negative effect, (p.
217) Our analysis allows the unionization rate to influence the
unemployment rate in several different ways; the data determine
whether the effect is positive, negative, or zero. We also estimate how
changes in the unionization rate would affect the unemploymentinflation trade-off.

1.2

The Methodological Issues

Given its evident importance, economists have focused a massive
amount of attention on the problem of unemployment. Unfortunately,
no consensus has been reached on its causes. A fundamental contro-
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versy in the profession is whether unemployment is better viewed as an
equilibrium or a disequilibrium phenomenon. Although one may argue
about the precise connotation of "equilibrium," for operational
purposes we take it to refer to a situation in which prices immediately
clear markets: prices are such that neither buyers nor sellers have any
reason to attempt to recontract. Applied to the labor market, this means
that at each instant the wage rate adjusts so that the supply and demand
of labor are equal.
In contrast, the disequilibrium approach views prices as rigid or at
least sticky they do not adjust instantaneously to equalize supply and
demand. Hence, suppliers or demanders may have to be rationed, i.e.,
they cannot obtain as much of a commodity as they desire at the current
price. In a disequilibrium labor market, the prevailing wage may be
above or below the wage that would equate demand and supply. 4
Both approaches have advantages and disadvantages. The notion of
equilibrium is a cornerstone of economics. It is an enormously useful
concept that has permitted a variety of important comparative statics
analyses of micro as well as macro phenomena. However, applying the
equilibrium paradigm to the analysis of labor market fluctuations leads
to an obvious problem if the supply and demand of labor are always
equal, then why is there any unemployment? As Altonji (1982) points
out, according to modern equilibrium theorists, the main reason is
intertemporal substitution:
In essence, the [equilibrium] hypothesis explains cyclical
fluctuations in employment and unemployment as the re
sponse of labour supply to perceived temporary movements
in the real wage. The key behavioral postulate is that leisure
in the current period is highly substitutable with leisure (and
goods) in other periods. Consequently, movements in the
current real wage . . . elicit a large labour supply response,
(p. 783)
In short, some individuals may choose unemployment this year
because they believe that they will be able to earn more next year. Is
this a sensible story? Critics of the equilibrium view find it implausible
that during the Great Depression 25 percent of the workforce was
unemployed only because so many people (mistakenly) believed that if
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they waited a while, they would command a higher wage rate.
Nevertheless, proponents of the equilibrium view argue that it provides
a good explanation of the historical data. (See, e.g., Lucas and
Rapping 1970.) On the other hand, other econometric tests of the
equilibrium hypothesis are not very favorable to it. (See Altonji 1982
or Mankiw, et al. 1982.)
In contrast, the disequilibrium formulation appears to accommodate
the phenomenon of unemployment with relative ease the wage rate is
"too high;" workers without jobs would be happy to work for less, but
the wage rate will not fall or, at least, will not fall sufficiently to clear
the market. But denial of wage flexibility, simple as that notion may
be, brings with it a host of difficulties in model specification and
estimation. For example, why do firms pay workers more than the
wages required by their potential replacements? After all, by defini
tion, those who are involuntarily unemployed would be willing to work
for a wage less than the prevailing one. In short, failure of markets to
clear is generally viewed as concomitant with the failure of some
agents to optimize.
However, under certain conditions sticky wages can be the outcome
of optimizing behavior by both firms and workers. For example, the fact
that firms do not always take advantage of opportunities to replace
workers with cheaper replacements may be due to costs of labor turn
over. Several more sophisticated theoretical attempts to rationalize
sticky wages are discussed in section 2.2.3 below. Whatever the success
of such theoretical exercises, however, proponents of disequilibrium
models are apt to point out that despite difficulties in explaining pre
cisely why the labor market does not clear at every moment in time, the
real world does seem to be like that, and this fact should be reflected
in economic analysis. As Rees (1970, p. 234) observes,
Although we know very little about the exact nature of the
costs of making wage changes, we can infer that they exist.
Wages are, next to house rents, the stickiest general class of
prices in the economy, seldom adjusted more frequently than
once a year. This stickiness may be reinforced by unionism
and collective bargaining, but it was present long before
unions arrived.
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The debate between protagonists of the equilibrium paradigm and
the disequilibrium paradigm has a strong ideological flavor. Propo
nents of one view frequently think that the alternative view is worthless
or perhaps downright silly. A few years ago, one of us gave several
seminars on the question of how one would test the null hypothesis that
a set of observations is better explained as having been generated from
an equilibrium as opposed to a disequilibrium specification. On some
of these occasions (mostly in the U.S.), five minutes into the seminar
it would be interrupted with the remark, "What you are trying to do is
silly, because everybody knows that prices always clear markets and
therefore there is nothing to test." At other times (mostly in Europe)
the interruption took the form, "What you are trying to do is silly,
because everybody knows that prices never clear markets and therefore
there is nothing to test." Juxtaposing the two remarks very much
convinced us that there definitely is something to test, and that any
approach that is not ultimately willing to subject such questions to data
as the final arbiter must be misguided.

1.3 Goals of this Monograph
The equilibrium vs. disequilibrium controversy is not only a matter
of methodological interest. Appropriate answers to the important
policy problems discussed in the first part of this chapter will depend
in part on whether an equilibrium or disequilibrium characterization of
the labor market is more appropriate. The goal of this essay is to
estimate both disequilibrium and equilibrium models of the U.S. labor
market, and to compare the results and their implications for policy. To
our knowledge, this is the first attempt to estimate and compare fairly
sophisticated equilibrium and disequilibrium labor market models.
A great deal of work in the U.S. labor market has followed the
equilibrium paradigm. The economic and statistical issues associated
with such models are now well understood, and there is no need for
them to be exposited here at great length. In contrast, there has not
been a great deal of work based on the disequilibrium paradigm. 5 We
shall therefore devote a disproportionate amount of time to discussing
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the problems that arise in formulating and estimating a disequilibrium
model.
Chapter 2 discusses equilibrium and disequilibrium approaches to
labor market analysis, with special focus on policy implications. In
chapter 3 we specify the disequilibrium model, and in chapter 4 the
results are presented and discussed. Chapter 5 contains the equilibrium
model. Chapter 6 concludes with comparisons between the disequili
brium and equilibrium results, and some suggestions for future
research.

NOTES
©This calculation was done using "Okun©s Law," which states that for each
1 percentage point reduction in the unemployment rate, real GNP will rise by
2.5 percent. If the actual rate of 7.1 percent had been reduced to an assumed
"natural rate" of 6.0 percent, then Okun©s Law implies an increase in real
GNP of (7.1 - 6.0) x 2.5 = 2.75 percent.
2For a careful discussion of the crime issue, see Massourakis, et al. (1984).
3For a discussion of the influence of tax changes on aggregate demand, see
Blinder (1981).
^©Disequilibrium" has often been construed to refer to a state in which
forces are at work to restore the system to equilibrium. This interpretation is
not intended here, since the state of disequilibrium may persist indefinitely.
For this reason, disequilibrium in the present sense is sometimes called a
"fix-price equilibrium."
5For some examples, see Rosen and Quandt (1978), Romer (1981), and
Artus, Laroque, and Michel (1984).

Equilibrium vs. Disequilibrium Labor
Market Analysis
In this chapter we discuss how labor markets have been treated in
equilibrium and disequilibrium contexts. As preface, two points should
be emphasized. First, we consider only analyses that deal with both
supply and demand in the labor market as a whole. Thus, we exclude
from discussion the very interesting disequilibrium analyses that have
been done of individual labor supply decisions without explicit
reference to the demand side of the market. (See, e.g., Ham 1982 and
Dickens and Lundberg 1985.)
Second, it is important to distinguish between the use of the term
"disequilibrium" in this monograph and its use in some previous
work. As noted in chapter 1, we characterize as disequilibrium a
situation in which price fails to clear a market. Hence, some agents
face rationing they cannot obtain all of the commodity they desire at
the going price. This usage is widespread and in conformity with much
of the literature, e.g., Barro and Grossman (1971), Fair and Jaffee
(1972), and Malinvaud (1976). In contrast, some authors characterize
a situation as being in disequilibrium if the actors fail to reach an
optimum in a given period, even though in each period prices adjust so
as to bring supply and demand towards equality. (See, e.g., Nadiri and
Rosen 1973, Chow 1977, and Sarantis 1981.) Thus, according to this
partial adjustment approach, any model in which either prices or
quantities (or both) adjust slowly in each period toward their long-run
values is in disequilibrium. There is no point in engaging in a semantic
discussion of which is the "real" meaning of disequilibrium. Suffice
it to say that very different maintained hypotheses are involved.

2.1 Equilibrium Labor Market Analysis
The biggest problem that equilibrium models of the labor market
have is explaining the existence of unemployment. In some equilib-
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rium models, this problem is "solved" by ignoring the existence of
unemployment. For example, Lewis (1963) and Pencavel and Hartsog
(1984) examine the effects of unionism on wage rates and hours of
work in a two-sector model of the labor market. The wage rate clears
the labor market each year. No unemployment equation is grafted onto
the analysis of wages and hours. From the point of view of public
policy toward unemployment, what do such models tell us? Given that
they make no attempt to deal with unemployment, the answer has to be
"nothing."
In contrast, the classic equilibrium model by Lucas and Rapping
(L-R) (1970) explicitly considers unemployment. A detailed discus
sion of the L-R model is provided in chapter 5. For the moment, we
merely describe its main components. The aggregate supply of labor
depends upon current and anticipated wages and prices, the interest
rate, and the market value of household assets. The demand side of the
model is derived from the marginal productivity condition for a
constant elasticity of substitution production function. There is no
disequilibrium in the model: "The current wage is assumed to equate
quantity demanded and quantity supplied each period" (Lucas and
Rapping 1970, p. 272). Nevertheless, L-R do allow for unemploy
ment, and posit that it is due to job search and erroneous wage-price
expectations. Using this theory of unemployment and making certain
simplifying assumptions, L-R complete their model with an equation
that relates the unemployment rate to current and lagged wages and
prices, and to the lagged unemployment rate.
In both the supply and demand equations, L-R exercise great care to
account for slow adjustment in behavior. In spite of this, they take as
a maintained hypothesis that the labor market itself is always in
equilibrium and that there is no lag in the response of the real wage to
changes in supply and demand.
From a policy point of view, two points are worth noting:
1. The model does allow for a short-run trade-off between inflation
and unemployment. This is possible because, by inflating wages (via
aggregate demand policy), the government can temporarily fool
workers into believing that their real wage has increased. Note,
however, that if one augments the L-R theory with rational expecta
tions i.e., workers© expectations are on average correct predictors of
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the future then the model implies that there is not even a short-run
trade-off between inflation and unemployment.
2. Unionization is ignored in the model. L-R correctly note that
theoretically, changes in the unionization rate have an ambiguous
effect upon the level of wages in the economy as a whole. If unions
increase the wage rate in the union sector, some workers may have to
seek jobs in the nonunion sector. But the influx of workers into the
nonunion sector may depress wages there, so the impact on the average
wage level is unclear. However, just because the overall impact is
ambiguous does not mean that it is zero. Unionization should at least
be considered for a role in the models of the labor market.

2.2 Disequilibrium Labor Market Analysis
2.2.1 Disequilibrium and the IS-LM Model
It is useful to begin our discussion of disequilibrium by considering
the standard "Keynesian" IS-LM model. In the current context, a key
point is that despite the fact that one often thinks of Keynesian analysis
as being "disequilibrium," in IS-LM analysis virtually all markets
clear. After all, the IS curve is the locus of equilibrium points in the
goods market; the LM curve is the locus of equilibrium points in the
money market; and their intersection is a point of general equilibrium.
The intersection of the IS and LM curves determines real output and
the interest rate. Where does unemployment come in? According to the
model, changes in output drive changes in employment. As suggested
in a popular elementary textbook: "Faster growth of real output
naturally means faster growth in the number of jobs and, hence, lower
unemployment. Conversely, slower growth of real output means
slower growth in the number of jobs and, hence, higher unemploy
ment" (Baumol and Blinder 1985, p. 311). Contrary to what this
statement implies, however, it is not "natural" that changes in output
will change the unemployment rate if wages are perfectly flexible in
the labor market, then there will be no unemployment, regardless of
the level of output. 1 In short, the IS-LM model appears to be an
equilibrium model of output and interest rate determination with a
disequilibrium model of the labor market grafted onto it.
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2.2.2 The Barro-Grossman Model
These inadequacies of the standard IS-LM model led Barro and
Grossman (B-G) (1971) to study the theoretical properties of a model
which allowed for price rigidities in all markets. Again, we will make
no attempt to summarize their entire analysis. We merely want to
provide enough of the flavor of their work to make the following point:
Theory shows that counter-intuitive results with respect to the efficacy
of various economic policies can arise in disequilibrium models.
Therefore, as an empirical matter, it is important to find out whether
disequilibria exist in various markets.
To begin, B-G consider a profit-maximizing firm employing labor
as its only input. Suppose that the firm believes that it can hire all the
labor it desires at the going real wage (W/P), and can sell all the output
it supplies at the going price (P). Then profit maximization leads to an
optimal quantity of labor hired LD , and an associated optimal quantity
of output supplied, Qs . Supplies and demands which are based on the
assumption that there will be no rationing are referred to as being
"notional."
Now suppose that the (rigid) price in the output market is such that
there is excess supply. Given the principle of voluntary exchange,
according to which no purchaser can be forced to buy more and no
seller to sell more than he or she wants, the quantity actually sold, Q,
will be the minimum of the quantity supplied and the quantity
demanded; in this case, then, Q < Qs . Facing this constraint, how
does the firm decide how much labor to hire? It simply hires the
minimum quantity required to produce Q; call it LD. Hence, the
constraint Q < Qs implies that LD < LD . What is remarkable about all
of this is that the effective demand for labor can change even if the real
wage stays constant. "The quantity of employment... is not uniquely
associated with the real wage" (Barro and Grossman 1971, p. 86).
Some further implications of the model can be obtained by referring
to figure 2.1. The horizontal axis measures the quantity of labor; the
vertical axis measures the real wage rate; LD is the notional demand for
labor, and Ls is the notional supply of labor. If Q = Qs , LD is the
effective demand for labor. If Q < Qs , the effective demand for labor,
LD , is independent of the real wage; this possibility is depicted by the
vertical line AB.
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Figure 2.1*

W/P

(W/P),
(W/P)2

LD
LD (given Q<QS)

*Based on figure 1 in Barro and Grossman (1971), p. 86.

Suppose that initially Qs = Q, so that equilibrium in the labor
market is determined by the intersection of LD and Ls at point E, which
is associated with a real wage of (W/P)j. Now say that there is a shock
to the system which leads to the current price level being too high to
clear the goods market. In this case, Q < Qs , and the labor demand
schedule is LD . Assuming that the real wage is rigid at (W/P) l5 the
quantity of labor supplied, FE, exceeds the quantity demanded (FC) by
the distance CE, which represents the amount of involuntary unem
ployment. Thus, involuntary unemployment is not a consequence of
the real wage being "too high."
Suppose now that a fall in the real wage to (W/P)2 were engineered.
Now there would be no involuntary unemployment. However, the
quantity of labor hired would still be suboptimal in the sense of being
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CE less than the quantity associated with general equilibrium. From a
policy perspective, the important result is that programs designed to
lower the real wage will not necessarily be the "cure" when the level
of employment is smaller than that associated with the general
equilibrium solution. In this example, the "fault" is due to inadequate
commodity demand, and the "cure" is to stimulate the goods market.
Of course, this need not be the case; for other configurations of
supply and demand in the goods and labor markets, real wage
reduction may be efficacious in reducing unemployment. Moreover, a
complete analysis should consider disequilibria in both markets simul
taneously. But for our purposes, the basic point has been made: policy
prescriptions that are appropriate in a world with flexible prices and
wages may be quite different from those which make sense when
prices and wages are fixed.
2.2.3 Theories of Nonmarket-Clearing Wages
B-G©s model begs the question of why wages are rigid, even in the
short run. As noted above, this is sometimes viewed as the Achilles©
heel of disequilibrium models, because it seems to imply the absence
of optimizing behavior. The purpose of this section is to give some
examples of the theorizing that has been done to rationalize the
existence of fixed wages.
a. Efficiency Wages. Our exposition of this model closely
follows Yellen (1984), but we change her notation to match ours.
Suppose that all workers are identical, and the amount of output
produced by a worker depends on his effort, e, which in turn depends
upon his real wage, W/P. We denote this functional dependence by
e(W/P). The number of "efficiency" units employed by the firm is the
number of workers hired, LD , times the effort per worker, or
e(W/P)LD . If labor is the only input, then firm output, Q, is given by
Q = F[e(W/P)LD], where F[-] is the production function. The firm has
to choose optimal values of W/P and LD; call them (W/P)f and LDt ,
respectively. The first order condition for profit maximization with
respect to W/P implies that (W/P)1" should be set such that the elasticity
of effort with respect to the real wage is unity. 2 For a given (W/P)f , the
number of workers hired is set so that the value of the marginal product
of a worker is equal to his wage: e(W/P)tF©[e(W/P)tLDt] = (W/P)1 ,
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that is to say, the number of efficiency units embodied in a worker
times the marginal product of each efficiency unit equals the worker©s
real wage.
Now, it is possible that (W/P)f may exceed labor©s reservation
wage. Unemployed workers would therefore be willing to work for a
lower wage, but firms will not find it profitable to hire them. Why not?
Because any reduction in the wage rate would lower the productivity
of those already employed.
The model also has something to say about the existence of a rigid
real wage, i.e., why shocks that change the marginal product of labor
tend to alter employment but not (W/P)*. To see this, simply note that
shifts in the marginal product of labor will not change the condition
that determines the real wage, i.e., that the elasticity of effort with
respect to the wage must equal one. See Yellen (1984) and footnote 2
for further details and references.
b. Dual Labor Markets. Salop (1979) develops a model in
which individual workers and firms face some uncertainty, although
there is no uncertainty in the aggregate. Workers are uncertain about
the nonpecuniary aspects of various jobs; they learn about these
characteristics only by experience, and may quit if they think they can
do better elsewhere. The firm can replace workers who quit, but must
pay "training costs" in connection with the new workers.
Let E be the employment of the firm, N the new hires, q the quit
rate, w the wage, and z a measure of general labor market conditions
(e.g., the average wage in the economy taking into account the ease of
getting a job). Quits are assumed to depend on the wage relative to
general labor market tightness,
q = q(w/z)
with q© < 0 and q" > 0. In a stationary state, it must be true that the
size of the firm does not change; hence N must equal q(w/z)E new
hires equal the actual number of quits.
The firm©s problem is to select employment E, new hires N and the
wage w, so as to maximize profits, taking into account the fact that
more new hires entail higher training costs. As expected, the solution
of this optimization problem yields expressions for E, N, and w in
terms of the only variable in the system that is exogenous to the firm,
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z: E = E(z), with E© < 0; w/z = W(z), with W < 0; and N = N(z)
with an unsigned derivative.
If we now assume that n firms operate in the economy, we can write
down economy-wide equilibrium conditions that determine the equi
librium values of z and n. The key result is that this equilibrium may
well be characterized by involuntary unemployment over and above
the frictional level of unemployment.
The intuitive basis for this finding is that new and old workers are
paid the same wage in the model. Thus, if there are n firms, there are
in general n wages that can perform market clearing. However, each
firm has two "markets" that need to be cleared; an internal market
which determines employment and quits, and an external one which
determines new hires. As Salop points out, "Since there are only n
prices attempting to clear 2n markets, it is not surprising that quantity
rationing must serve as the clearing device in some markets, leading to
the possibility of unemployment at the equilibrium." (p. 121)
c. Implicit Contracts. Textbook models of the labor market
view it as a spot market each period the wage clears the market,
thereby equating the marginal revenue product of labor with the wage.
A number of writers (see Azariadis 1975 or Baily 1974) have argued
that it is more appropriate to view the wage setting process as being
governed by long-term contracts between employee and employer.
The "contracts" are not written down and legally binding; rather, they
are implicit agreements that are maintained because both sides have
incentives to continue the relationship.
Why do such implicit contracts arise? Workers are faced with
uncertain streams of income, and it is very difficult for them to shed
this risk by purchasing private insurance. One possible way for the
workers to reduce risk is to pass some of it to firms through long-term
contracts which reduce the sensitivity of wages to demand fluctua
tions. Thus, when times are (unexpectedly) good, workers will receive
a real wage that is less than their marginal revenue product. Con
versely, when times are (unexpectedly) bad, the real wage exceeds the
marginal product. The difference between the marginal revenue
product and the wage when times are good can be thought of as an
insurance premium which finances the higher than marginal revenue
product wage when times are bad. As long as the firm is less risk
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averse than its workers, it pays for the firm to enter into such
arrangements it will be able to pay workers less on average because
the workers value the insurance being provided by the firm. Again,
then, there is nothing necessarily irrational about rigid wages.
Summary. Recent theoretical developments have gone a long way
toward explaining the stickiness of real wages. As Azariadis and
Stiglitz (1983) and Lindbeck and Snower (1985) note, there are still
many problems with these models. In particular, in implicit contract
models it is difficult to explain convincingly just why sticky wages are
associated with unemployment. (This is because in some of these
models a low sticky wage is the price paid by workers for greater
employment security.) However, enough theoretical work on the
consistency of sticky wages and rational behavior has been done so that
nonmarket-clearing models should not be dismissed out of hand.

NOTES
JWe are, of course, ignoring the "search unemployment" discussed in
w
section 2.1 above.
2Real profits, IT, can be written TT = F(e(W/P)LD) - -£ LD . The firm©s
first order conditions for profit maximization are
d(W/P)

= F©e©LD - LD = 0

= F©e -

P.

= 0.

Equation (i) implies
F©e© = 1;

(i)

(ii)
v ©

(iii)

Equation (ii) implies
y = F©e.

(iv)

W e©
= F©e©, which equals 1 by
Multiplying both sides of (iv) by e©/e yields
XT C
W e©
is the required elasticity, so the result is proven.
equation (iii). But
P e

Formulating a Disequilibrium Model
3.1 Introductory Remarks
In this section we specify an estimable disequilibrium model of the
labor market. Before discussing each equation of the model, it is
important to answer two general questions.
i. Why study just the labor market? The theoretical discussion in
chapter 2 indicated that the interaction between various markets can
have important consequences for the efficacy of macroeconomic
policy. Does it not follow that a general disequilibrium model should
be estimated? The problem with that strategy is a practical one. As will
be seen below, the technology of estimating disequilibrium models is
sufficiently difficult that, given currently available computational
methods, estimating a general disequilibrium model is extremely
difficult. This is particularly true if the individual markets are to be
modeled in some detail. A start has to be made somewhere; we believe
that careful analysis of one market in disequilibrium is a good
beginning.
Given that technological considerations impel a partial disequili
brium analysis, why choose the labor market, rather than the goods or
money markets? We think that from the point of view of achieving
results that may be useful from a policy point of view, the labor market
is most important. To see why, note that many economists agree that
if some kind of shock moves the economy away from a full
employment equilibrium, there are self-correcting mechanisms that
will eventually restore the system to full employment. The crucial
question for designing policy is, how long do we have to wait? If the
labor market responds quickly to shocks in the sense that excess supply
quickly brings down wages, then one does not need to wait very long.
Activist macroeconomic policies are not required. Conversely, if
wages tend to be very rigid, then such policies may be useful. We think
17

18 The Conflict Between Equilibrium and Disequilibrium Theories

that a key issue dividing "Keynesians" and "neoclassicists" is how
well the labor market works.
More than 40 years ago, Modigliani (1944) noted that economists©
understanding of the labor market appeared to be the weak link in
comprehending macroeconomic phenomena. 1 It is still true today,
which is why the labor market seems a natural focus for our attention.
ii. Must the model have "choice-theoretic foundations" ? As a
methodological stance, it is now widely agreed that equations in
econometric models should have "choice-theoretic foundations." This
means that the behavioral relations should be based on optimizing
behavior by various agents. It is hard to disagree with this prescription
for rigor in modeling, and to the extent possible, we have tried to
follow it. Nevertheless, there are at least two reasons why it is not
sensible to make a fetish out of choice-theoretic foundations. These
points, incidentally, apply equally well to equilibrium and disequili
brium models.
First, virtually all that theory tells us about is the decisions of
individual units, either firms or people. If we seek to explain market
phenomena, the decision rules of these individuals must be aggregated.
However, even if a rigorously derived equation explains the behavior
of an individual, it is only in very special (and unlikely) cases that the
same functional form will correctly describe aggregate behavior.
Unfortunately, equations for aggregate behavior carefully derived by
adding up those for individuals are usually econometrically intractable.
The usual solution is to assume that individuals in the aggregate act
"as if" they were a single optimizing individual. Thus, for example,
the aggregate demand curve for labor is customarily derived as if there
were one firm with a particular production function. This is a
convenient fiction, which helps to inject some discipline into the
modeling process by narrowing the set of explanatory variables, aiding
in the choice of functional form, etc. Still, it is a fiction, and the fact
that the estimates of the parameters of an "aggregate individual"
equation may not be consistent with constraints imposed by individual
maximization is not necessarily damning.
Second, sometimes there are simply no choice-theoretic foundations
upon which to build. For example, it is commonly assumed that for a
market out of equilibrium the rate of price change is proportional to the
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discrepancy between quantity supplied and quantity demanded (See
e.g., Samuelson 1970). This is a convenient formulation, but why
should it be true? One might argue as follows. Assume that there exist
demand and supply functions D(pt), S(pt) depending on current price.
If the economic system behaved as if it incurred certain costs whenever
prices change (adjustment costs) and whenever demand failed to equal
supply (disequilibrium costs), one might think of the system as
minimizing a cost function C = 6i(pt -pt_i)2 + 62(D(pt) - S(pt))2 .
Differentiating this with respect to pt and setting equal to zero yields an
equation of the form pt - pt-i = <y(D(pt) - S(pt)) if demand and
supply are both linear. This appears to justify the assumption that price
change is proportional to excess demand, but one cannot avoid asking
why we should think of the economic system acting so as to minimize
the cost C. Investigators are thus forced to use such ad hoc specifica
tions because there is currently no satisfactory theory of adjustment
costs, and how they influence the rate of price change.

3.2

The Disequilibrium Modet2

Our model consists of six equations, one each for the marginal
productivity of labor, the supply of labor, the observed quantity of
labor, nominal wages, the price level, and the vacancy-unemployment
rate relationship. The deterministic version of each equation is
discussed in turn. We defer until section 3.3 the matter of stochastic
specification.
Marginal Productivity of Labor. A necessary condition for profit
maximization requires that the marginal product of labor equal the real
wage:
(Wt/Pt) = fL(Lt,Kt,t)

(3.2.1)

where fL is the partial derivative of the production function,
Qt = f(Lt,Kt,t),

(3.2.2)

and where Qt is output, Lt is man-hours of labor,3 Kt is the flow of
services of capital, and t is a time trend representing the state of
technical progress in period t. Solving (3.2.1) for Kt, substituting this
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into (3.2.2), assuming that the resulting equation can be solved for Lt ,
and calling the quantity of labor demanded Dt , yields
Dt = D((Wt/Pt),Qt,t).

(3.2.3)

Although (3.2.3) is a proper structural relationship, it is not a reduced
form equation and hence not in the usual form for the demand equation
because of the appearance of the endogenous variable Qt on the right
hand side. It also appears desirable to assume that the notional and
actual output variables coincide and may thus both be symbolized by

QtEquation (3.2.3) assumes that the demand for labor adjusts instan
taneously to change in output; we can allow for the possibility of lags
in the process by positing
Dt = D((Wt/Pt),Qt,Qt_ 1 ,t).
For purposes of estimation, a log-linear approximation (except for t)
is employed:4
n Dt = a0 + ai n(Wt/Pt) + a2 nQt
+ a3 nQt_i + a4t.

(3.2.4)

Formulation (3.2.4) (or a minor variant) is a common starting point for
both equilibrium and disequilibrium studies of labor markets (see, for
example, Lucas and Rapping 1970, Rosen and Quandt 1978, Romer
1981, Smyth (undated), Hajivassiliou 1983 and Bernanke 1984.)
Nevertheless, ideally one would want to study a multimarket model in
which output was treated econometrically as an endogenous variable.
This task is beyond the scope of the current study, and for tractability
it will be assumed that output is exogenous.
Supply of Labor. The total number of man-hours supplied in year
t depends upon the real net wage, (Wnt/Pt), and the potential labor
force, Ht, which is essentially a scale variable to capture the effect of
population growth. Again assuming a log-linear specification:
nSt = ft, + Mn(Wnt/Pt) + MnHt

(3.2.5)

where St denotes notional supply. The basic theory of labor supply
suggests that nonlabor income belongs in equation (3.2.5). However,
Romer (1981) pointed out that unearned income is endogenous in a life
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cycle model of labor supply determination, and shows that more
sensible results can be obtained when it is omitted.
Equation (3.2.5) ignores the impact that unions might have upon the
supply of labor. Specifically, it has been argued that some unions have
"forced employers to agree to hire only union workers, thereby giving
the union virtually complete control of the supply of labor. Then, by
following restrictive membership practices long apprenticeships,
exorbitant initiation fees, the limitation or flat prohibition of new
members the union causes an artificial restriction in the labor
supply" (McConnell 1966, p. 562). To explore whether or not such a
unionization effect is present, we augment (3.2.5) with a variable
UNIONt, the proportion of the labor force that is unionized:
nSt = po + Mn(Wnt/Pt) +
+ p3UNIONt .

(3.2.6)

Note that equation (3.2.6) ignores the possible roles of intertemporal
labor supply substitution and expectations concerning future labor
market conditions. From a logical point of view, there is nothing to
prevent a careful examination of expectational issues in the context of
a disequilibrium model; indeed, this has been attempted by Eaton and
Quandt (1983) and Hall, et al. (1985). Nevertheless, since most of the
"action" in explaining unemployment in equilibrium models comes
from expectations, we felt that a sharper comparison of the two
approaches would be possible if expectational issues were not stressed
in the disequilibrium model. We note in passing, however, that for at
least some simple expectational models the main implication is that the
lagged wage as well as its current value appear in the supply equation.
When we augmented equation (3.2.6) with the lagged real net wage,
we found that it did not have much of an impact on the other parameter
values.
Observed Quantity of Labor. In an equilibrium model, the ob
served quantity of labor is determined by the intersection of the supply
and demand curves. In a disequilibrium model, this is not the case. In
conformity with most of the work in disequilibrium theory, we assume
that the quantity observed is the minimum of the quantities supplied
and demanded at the current wage:

22 The Conflict Between Equilibrium and Disequilibrium Theories

= min ( nSt, nDt).

(3.2.7)

Equation (3.2.7) is perhaps the most distinctive component of the
disequilibrium model. The fact that in any given year the observed
quantity of labor is on either the supply or demand curve but a priori
we don©t know which one accounts for most of the statistical
problems associated with disequilibrium models.
In this context, it is useful to recall from chapter 2 that some writers
have characterized a model as "disequilibrium" merely if prices
and/or quantities fail to achieve their long-run values in any given
period. As Chow (1977) shows, such models can be estimated by
garden variety simultaneous equations methods. In our opinion,
however, the failure of markets to clear, which is central to the
theoretical disequilibrium models discussed in section 2.2, is the
essential aspect of the disequilibrium phenomenon, and must be dealt
with head on.
Clearly, equation (3.2.7) does not describe completely what is
presumably a very complicated rationing story. It has been pointed out
(Muellbauer 1977, and Hajivassiliou 1983) that a formulation such as
(3.2.7) may represent some misspecification in situations in which the
aggregate labor market is, in effect, the sum of many individual
submarkets. If some of these exhibit excess demand while others, at
the same time, have excess supply, the observed transacted quantity
can be shown to be strictly less than either aggregate demand or
aggregate supply. The appropriate econometric estimating method
depends very much on how one assumes the aggregation of submarkets
is accomplished. Quandt (1986) has shown that for at least one broad
class of aggregation procedures, the theoretically misspecified proce
dure based on the simple "min condition" still gives acceptable
results. In any event, the "min condition" helps keep the problem
tractable, and we are assuming that the misspecification involved in
(3.2.7) is not too serious in practice.
Nominal Wage Adjustment. Thus far, our model says little about
how the history of wage and price movements affects the current
nominal wage. Standard models of "sluggish" behavior imply that the
current value of a particular variable will depend on its past values;
hence, we expect Wt to depend on its past values. Similarly, lagged
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prices are included because of the expectation that workers© nominal
wage requests will depend on the extent of recent price changes.
Ceteris paribus, higher prices will result in high nominal wages.
(Indeed, in much of the union sector, indexing is formally built into
wage contracts.) As usual, theory does not give much guidance with
respect to the pattern of lags; the specification reported below was
superior to several alternatives in the sense of leading to the best fit to
the data.
We also included in the nominal wage equation the official unem
ployment rate, Ut , and the change in the unionization rate, AUNIONt .
The presence of the official unemployment rate reflects the possibility
that when the labor market is slack (high Ut), then nominal wages will
be lower, ceteris paribus, and vice versa. The change in unionization
variable allows for the possibility that unions can exogenously raise the
nominal wage above the level that otherwise would have obtained. The
change in the unionization rate rather than its level reflects the
assumption that an increase in unionization induces a once-and-for-all
increase in the nominal wage; all of the union©s "monopoly power" is
exploited immediately.
We can summarize the preceding discussion of the determinants of
the nominal wage with the following equation:
nWt = y0
+ ©Y3( nPt - nPt_ 1 )

+
+ -v6AUNIONt .

(3.2.8)

One final issue concerns the use of Ut as a measure of slackness in
the labor market. It is well known that unemployment as measured in
the official statistical series does not correspond well to the theoretical
notion of unemployment as the inability to find work at the going
wage. (See the discussion of the vacancy-unemployment relationship
below.) Why not, then, include excess demand, ( nDt - nSt), rather
than Ut? The choice of Ut reflects the fact that workers and employers
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do not know ( nDt - nSt); they have to rely on their perceptions of
the labor market situation, and these are well measured by Ut. Indeed,
when we estimated the model including ( nDt - nSt) instead of Ut,
implausible parameter estimates resulted.
Price Adjustment. The price level of this period depends upon the
lagged price level and the recent history of nominal wage changes:
= S +

+ 84( nPFt - nPFt_!) + 85t,

(3.2.9)

where PFt is a price index for energy in period t. The lagged price term
reflects sluggishness in the price adjustment process. Lagged nominal
wages are included because producers take factor costs into account
when setting their prices. (Such behavior is consistent with, for
example, simple mark-up models of pricing behavior.) The presence of
the energy price variable is responsive to the suggestion of Gordon
(1982) and others that macroeconomic price equations be augmented
with variables to account for "price shocks" which exogenously affect
prices. (Note that because we do not attempt to model disequilibrium
in the goods market, excess demand does not appear in (3.2.9).)
Vacancy-Unemployment Relationship. Let Vt be the vacancy rate
defined as the ratio of vacancies to the total labor force in year t, and
Ut be the official unemployment rate, both measured as fractions.
Ignore for the moment that Ut does not measure correctly the
discrepancy between the amount of labor supplied and the amount
workers desire to supply at the prevailing wage. Then by definition,
Dt = Lt(l+Vt) and St = Lt(l+Ut), which imply

St

1 + Ut

Taking logarithms,
nDt - nSt = n(l+Vt) - n(l+Ut).
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If Vt and Ut are fairly small, then a Taylor Series approximation gives
us
nDt - nSt = Vt - Ut.

(3.2.10)

Unfortunately, U.S. annual data for the vacancy rate do not exist for
our sample period. Pencavel (1974) suggests that the vacancy rate is a
stable function of the unemployment rate which can be approximated
by the hyperbolic relationship5
Vt = \/Ut,

(3.2.11)

where X is a parameter. Substituting into (3.2.10) leads to
nDt - nSt = A - ut.

(3.2.12)

Equation (3.2.12) gives the relationship between the official unem
ployment rate and the excess demand for labor. It does not hold as an
identity for three reasons. First, equation (3.2.10) holds as an approx
imation. Second, equation (3.2.11) holds only as an approximation as
well. Third, it is likely that Ut measures the © ©true" unemployment rate
with error. As Lucas and Rapping (1970, p. 272) note:
The government generates an unemployment series based on
the number of people who answer yes to the question: Are
you actually seeking work? There is strong temptation to
assume that respondents to this survey take the question to
mean, Are you seeking work at the current wage rate?, but
it is important to recognize that this assumption is simply a
hypothesis, the truth of which is far from obvious.
Indeed, one possible way to interpret equation (3.2.12) is not as a
"vacancies equation," but simply as a way to summarize the relation
ship between the excess demand for labor and the official unemploy
ment rate.

3.3 Econometric Issues
In this section we give a brief introduction to the problems of
estimation in the context of both equilibrium and disequilibrium
models. Estimation in equilibrium models is well understood and our
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treatment here can be brief; however, we cannot omit it altogether
because both the similarities (such as they are) and the more important
differences between the two cases are instructive. In order to highlight
these and to avoid getting bogged down in the details of our actual
models, we concentrate on some general formulations that do not have
concrete economic content.
The Equilibrium Model. Consider a single market for a hypothet
ical good. The market demand fof this good in period t, Dt, is derived
by aggregating individual consumers© demand curves. The individual
demand curves, in turn, are the outcome when consumers maximize
their utility functions subject to a budget constraint. Under a variety of
circumstances, it is reasonable to approximate market demand linearly
as
Dt = a lPt + pjx lt + ult

(3.3.1)

where pt is the price, a i is an (unknown) coefficient, PjXlt is shorthand
for PiiXnt + ($12X121 + . . . + PikXikt and expresses the effect on
demand of certain other variables that are external (exogenous or
predetermined) to the key variables of interest, and uu is an error term,
intrinsically unobservable but nevertheless there, that expresses errors
of specification and measurement. Similarly, producers© supply is
derived by maximizing their profit (or whatever other objective is
appropriate in the institutional setting considered) subject to the
production function which constrains the manner in which inputs can
be transformed into outputs. After aggregation we can write
S. = a2pt + P2*2t + u2t

(3.3.2)

where x2t denotes the exogenous and predetermined variables appro
priate to the determination of supply. As usual, $i\\t and 32x2t both
include a constant term.
The key feature of the equilibrium model is that the observer©s
measurements on the key items, price and quantity traded, always
correspond to equilibrium values. Under these circumstances Dt = St
and we can assign the common label Yt. Equations (3.3.1) and (3.3.2)
then become
Yt = alPt + pjx lt + UH.

(3.3.3)
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Y, = a2pt + p2x2t + u2t .

(3.3.4)

The problem of estimation then is this: given data on Yt, pt and on the
additional variables x lt , x2t, how do we obtain reasonable guesses for
the unknown coefficients a t , Pi, a2 , p2?
All the estimation problems share the characteristic that a model
must be specified and more or less extensive assumptions must be
made about it. In the present case this includes the specification of the
mathematical form of the equations (3.3.3) and (3.3.4); it includes the
assumption that variables Xit, x2t are predetermined, i.e., that their
statistical properties or behavior depend neither on Yt and pt nor on the
coefficients al5 Pi, a2 , p2; and finally it includes some assumption
about the statistical behavior of the error terms u!t, u2t (e.g., that the
population of error terms has zero mean, perhaps constant variance,
perhaps that the values of Uit, u2t do not depend on previously obtained
values for some other time period, and so on). Any one of these
assumptions could, of course, be in error and there are systematic
procedures (specification tests) with which the validity of the assump
tions can be investigated. But apart from that, two features need to be
noted: (1) Any method of estimation that is appropriate to a model will
produce "good" estimates, i.e., estimates that have desirable statis
tical properties such as unbiasedness (in rare instances) or consistency
and efficiency, only to the extent that reality corresponds to the
assumptions of the model. (2) If reality does correspond to the model©s
assumption, we are literally acting as if "nature" generated observa
tions on the jointly dependent variables Yt and pt according to the
following "algorithm." First, nature, knowing the values of all the
coefficients and all the x©s, computes Pix u and P2x2t. Next, nature
draws randomly two error terms UH, u2t from the appropriate statistical
distribution. Denoting for simplicity pix u + u^byci and p2x2t + u2t
by c2 , nature then solves the pair of simultaneous linear equations:
Yt Yt - a2pt = c2
for Yt and pt, and then allows us to see the solution values.
As is well known, there are numerous ways to estimate such a model
(see Chow 1983, chapter 5). Although it may seem tempting to apply
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ordinary least squares, equation by equation, that is an undesirable
method since it produces inconsistent estimates. However, two-stage
and three-stage least squares and several other methods are appropriate.
Here we briefly review only one particular method, full information
maximum likelihood. We do so partly because it has extremely desirable
properties and partly because in disequilibrium models it is frequently
the only practicable method; thus the comparison is of some interest.
We start out by assuming that the error terms Ujt, u2t are jointly
normally distributed. For the sake of conceptual and notational
simplicity we consider a "bare bones" case: (i) the statistical distri
bution of UH, U2t is identical for all values of t; (ii) the expected values
of u !t, u2t are zero. Now define the joint density function of ujt and u2t ,
f(ult,u2t), as the function which shows the probability that any
particular combination of UH and u2t will occur. 6 Given assumptions (i)
and (ii), it can be shown that
1

f(u lt,u2t) =

1
-°?2>

cru
2lt

2., 2

- 2a 12u ltu2t

(3.3.5)

where CTJ, cr2 are the variances of u lt, u2t and cr12 is the covariance
between them. Using the definition of UH and u2t from equations
(3.3.3) and (3.3.4), we can obtain from equation (3.3.5) the joint
density of Yt,pt (which are also random variables). This density is
h(Yt ,pt) =

a,- a,

exp

1

oi(Yt -a lPt -(};xu)

- 2cr12(Yt -a 1pt -pix lt)(Yt -a2pt -p2x2t)

(3.3.6)
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The term lai a2 l is the Jacobian of the transformation from the u©s
to (Yt,pt); for a rationale for its presence, see appendix 3.1 In the
simplified case in which ult and u2t are uncorrelated, (i.e., a 12 = 0)
(3.3.6) becomes
1 (Yt -a lPt-p;x lt)2

h(Yt,Pt) =

WA^7

<

2©JTO©iO©2

2

2

_L (Yt ~a2pt - P2*2t )2]]

The product of the densities over all time periods (i.e. observations)
for which data are available is the likelihood function. Maximum
likelihood estimates are obtained by maximizing this function (or
rather its logarithm) with respect to the unknown parameters cii, Pi,
<*2, p2» o"?, oi and ai2 (if present); i.e., declaring that set of parameter
values to be our estimates for which the value of
L = -T Iog2ir -

o?2) + T log|a t - a2|

- ,,, 2 1 2 , 2 fe(Yt -a lPt -pix lt)2
2(a 1a2 -cr 12) .=1 L
(T2(Yt -a2pt -p2 x2t)
- 2a12(Yt -a 1 pt -pix lt)(Yt -a2pt -32x2t;l

(3.3.7)

(where T is the total number of observations), is larger than for any
other set of parameter values. Parameter estimates obtained in this
fashion have the desirable statistical properties of consistency, effi
ciency and asymptotic normality.
Finding the maximum likelihood estimates is not nearly as routine a
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computational exercise as, say, computing least squares estimates,
since it involves numerical optimization of the function (3.3.7). We
comment on this briefly at the end of this section.
The Disequilibrium Model. In the equilibrium model it was taken
for granted that all variables, exogenous or endogenous, predetermined
or jointly determined, are always observable. This is not the case for
the disequilibrium model. This difference is the key to characterizing
the econometric distinction between the two approaches and is the
source of the difficulties inherent in the disequilibrium model.
In the equilibrium model we assumed that prices are flexible and so
adjust as to clear the market. It was this assumption that allowed us to
set Dt = St = Yt; the "price" we paid for this was that the good©s
price could not be just any number. In fact, it has to be that unique
number that solves (3.3.3) and (3.3.4). In contrast, in the simplest
disequilibrium model, we assume that the price does not adjust at all:
it is completely rigid. (This assumption is made only for expositional
simplicity. In our concrete labor market models the wage is sticky but
not completely rigid.) Then Dt need not equal St and we are dealing
with (3.3.1) and (3.3.2) supplemented by a relation that describes what
we observe for quantity, namely
Yt = min(Dt, St).

(3.3.8)

This is radically different from the equilibrium approach. In equilib
rium we observe Yt which we know equals both Dt and St . Here we
observe Yt and we know that it either equals Dt or St, but we do not
know which, since Dt and St are not observed as such.
Models with some unobservability have become fairly well known.
Simple models with some unobservability are the probit and tobit
models. (See Chow 1983, chapter 8.) It is interesting to review the
statistical issues surrounding probit and tobit models because they
share some important traits with disequilibrium models. In the probit
model, we posit that a continuous random variable y* is determined
from a conventional linear equation,
y* = P©xt + ut,
but that y* itself is not observed by the investigator. Instead, she
observes a variable yt which is related to y* by the relations
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yt = lifyt*>0
yt = 0 if otherwise.
In the tobit model the mapping between y* and yt is somewhat
different:

yt = y* if yt* > o
yt = 0 otherwise.
Since maximum likelihood estimation has desirable statistical proper
ties, and since the likelihood function is the product over the obser
vations of the densities, it is useful to derive the densities in these
models. Consider the probit case. The observable yt has only two states,
0 and 1, and so we seek the discrete probability distribution of yt .
By the elementary rules of manipulating probabilities,
Pr{yt = 1} = Pr{yt = n y; > 0}Pr{y; > 0}
+ Pr{yt = ll y;<0}Pr{y;<0}
and

(3.3.9)
Pr{yt = 0} = Pr{yt = Olyt* > 0}Pr{yt* > 0}
+ Pr{yt = Oly* < 0} Pr{yt* < 0}

where Pr{AIB} denotes the probability of event A conditional on event
B. But, by definition,
Pr{yt = lly; > 0} = 1
Myt = lly,* ^ 0} = 0
Pr{yt = Olyt* > 0} = 0
Pr{yt = Olyt* < 0} = 1.
Thus
Pr{yt = 1} = Pr{yt* > 0}
Pr{yt = 0} = Pr{yt* < 0}.
If ut is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance l.O,7
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Pr(y* > 0} = Pr{p©xt + ut > 0) = Pr(ut > - 0©xJ

A
i e -z2/2
rp©x ——
z dz =
V2TT

J-oo

where <!>( ) denotes the integral of the standard normal density from
minus infinity to the indicated argument. As noted above, the
likelihood function is the product of the densities and can be written as:
L=

II

y,= l

<D(|3©xt)

II

y, = 0

(1 - <P(P©xt)).

(3.3.10)

In the simple disequilibrium model under consideration, life is a bit
more complicated but the reasoning is similar. The observable random
variable is Yt , and in analogy with (3.3.9) we can take advantage of
basic probability theory to write (Maddala and Nelson 1974, and
Quandt 1982):
h(Yt) = f(Yt IDt < St)Pr{Dt < St}
+ f(YtIDt > St) Pr{Dt > SJ.

(3.3.11)

The question is, how do we obtain the conditional density (f(Yt IDt <
St)? From (3.3.1) and (3.3.2) we can easily obtain the density g(Dt,St)
on the assumption (as before) that u lt, u2t are normally distributed with
zero means. The conditional density g(Dt,St I Dt < St) is, by the
elementary probability rules, g(Dt,St)/Pr{Dt < Sj. When the event
Dt < St occurs, Dt = Yt, so we can write this as g(Yt, St)/Pr{Dt < Sj.
The density of Yt is made up of the densities of all those pairs of Dt
(= Yt) and St values for which St > Dt; hence to get all the density of
Yt irrespective of St, we must "add up" these individual density
values. Since we are dealing with continuous random variables, we
must integrate, and thus
f(Yt|Dt < St) = f g(Yt,St)dSt/Pr{Dt < Sj
J\,

f(Yt|Dt i= St) = f g(Dt,Yt)dDt/Pr(Dt ^ Sj.
JY,
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It follows that
h(Yt) = f g(Yt , St)dSt + f g(Dt, Yt)dDt.
JY,

JY,

(3.3.12)

Working out the algebra for (3.3.12) gives
exp .

h(Yt) =

X

exp
X/2TTCT,

X

(Yt-a2pt -|32x2tX
2a

(3.3.13)

The resulting likelihood function, obtained by multiplying together
terms such as (3.3.13) is quite different from and generally more
complicated than in the case of the equilibrium model. 8 First of all,
the density, and hence the likelihood, contains <!>(), the integral of the
normal density, which itself can be computed only as a numerical
approximation (although very fast and accurate algorithms exist).
More seriously, the resulting likelihood function has a curious
property not shared by the equilibrium likelihood; namely, that it can
become unbounded in parameter space. What this means is that in the
space of potential parameters values there exist some isolated points at
which the likelihood function becomes arbitrarily large; yet these
points do not normally correspond to reasonable values of the
parameters. (For a proof of this see Quandt 1982.) An efficient
computational algorithm that is intended to find the maximum of the
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likelihood function might (and in practice sometimes does) hit upon
such points. Although this condition is almost always diagnosed
(since it is invariably accompanied by one or the other residual
variances becoming zero), and so the investigator is not usually
misled into believing that the point arrived at is a reasonable estimate,
the condition may sometimes effectively impede the computation of
reasonable estimates.
Numerical Optimization. Both equilibrium and disequilibrium
likelihood maximization require the use of computer algorithms for
numerical optimization. The reason is that the function to be maxi
mized is sufficiently nonlinear, so that as a practical matter the point
of maximum value cannot be easily obtained by setting the first partial
derivatives equal to zero and solving.
A "simple" algorithm would be to evaluate the likelihood function
for all possible combinations of parameter values and choose the
combination that leads to the highest value. Such a procedure is not
feasible. There are infinitely many parameter combinations that might
be considered. Even if one succeeded in restricting one©s attention to
a finite number, such a procedure would be terribly inefficient
billions of computations would have to be made, outstripping the
capacities of even modern computers. Instead, algorithms have been
developed which search for an optimum in a more systematic fashion.
Nearly all such algorithms operate by starting at some point in the
parameter space, choosing a direction in which the function is
improving, taking a (small) step in that direction and then repeating the
procedure until some criterion indicates that further function improve
ments cannot be obtained.
The starting point has to be supplied by the econometrician and
immediately suggests that "good guesses," i.e. starting values that
happen to be near the ultimate maximum, are very useful. A good
direction is obviously one in which the function is increasing
relatively most rapidly. In a local sense, i.e., for small displacements,
the direction of fastest increase is given by the gradient of the
function, i.e., by the vector that contains as its elements the first
partial derivatives of the function. Thus, if the function is f =
0?
20|, which attains its maximum at 61 = 62 = 0, the gradient is the
vector (- 26i, - 402); hence, if the initial guess was 61 = 02 = 1,
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Figure 3.1

we should take a step that moves two units to the east and four units
north.
However, for more complicated functions, this is not an obviously
efficient procedure. Consider the function whose contours are depicted
in figure 3.1. The maximum is at A. If we happened to start at B, the
gradient points approximately in the direction shown by the arrow
emanating from B, and obviously carries us roughly in the right
direction. But if we happened to start at C, the gradient appears to
carry us in the "wrong" direction, at least for a little while. For this
reason, more complicated algorithms are often employed; we now
briefly outline one of these.
Imagine that the function to be maximized is F(6) with 6 being an
m-parameter vector. Denote by 6k the value of 6 at the kth iteration of
the algorithm. Expanding F(6k) in Taylor Series about 0k~ ! , we could
write to an approximation
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F(ek) = Fce*- 1) + G(ek" 1)©(ek-ek" 1) + i(ek-ek" 1)©
H(ek" 1xek-ek~ 1)
where G(6k~ 1) is the gradient, i.e., the vector of first partial deriva
tives and H(6k-1 ) is the Hessian, i.e., the matrix of second partial
derivatives. To obtain, for given 6k-1 , the value of 9k that maximizes
the improvement in the function F(0k) - F(6k~ 1), differentiate with
respect to 6k and set the resulting expression equal to zero, yielding

G(Qk~ l) + H(6k- 1xek-ek- 1) = o

or
6k = 8k-i _ H- 1 (ek~ 1 )G(ek~ 1).

(3.3.14)

Iterating according to (3.3.14) is known as Newton's Method; a fast
and accurate procedure that requires that the function be concave
(otherwise (3.3.14) generates a sequence of 9k going in the "wrong"
direction). Newton©s method and its variants (e.g., GRADX; see
Goldfeld, Quandt, Trotter 1966) are powerful; however, they are
expensive to compute because they require computation of second
derivatives, (i.e., the H matrix of equation (3.3.14)). Other algorithms
such as the Davidon-Fletcher-Powell (DFP) method or the Powell
Conjugate Gradient method are somewhat less reliable but they are
also less expensive. In general, there is no method that is best in every
situation, and in practice it is useful to have numerous optimization
algorithms available. 9

Appendix 3.1
The Role of the Jacobian of the Transformation
This appendix explains intuitively why the Jacobian of the transfor
mation appears in density functions like equation (3.3.6). The rationale
for the Jacobian can be most easily illustrated for the univariate case.
Consider a random variable x, with density function f(x), plotted in the
first quadrant of figure A3.1. Assume that x is related to y via some
specified function x = g(y), plotted in the fourth quadrant of the

Formulating a Disequilibrium Model 37
Figure A3.1

g(y)

figure. We propose to derive the density of the random variable y.
(Note that if x = 3y + 4 and x is random, then y is random). We know
that the resulting density h(y) must have the following property.
Suppose that there is a certain probability, say P, that x is between the
values a and b. Then the probability (calculated from h(y)) that y is
between g-1 (a) and g-1 (b) must also be P. That means that the shaded
area in the first quadrant, which is approximately f(x)dx (dx is a small
width along the x-axis) must equal the shaded area in the third
quadrant, h(y)dy. But if we substitute g(y) for x and note that by
definition dx = g©(v)cly, we have
f(x)dx = f(g(y))g©(y)dy = h(y)dy
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and hence h(y) = f(g(y))g©(y), where g©(y) is the Jacobian of the
transformation. Geometrically, if g(y) is steep, a relatively narrow
x-interval translates to a relatively wide y-interval; hence to keep
shaded areas the same, the height of h(y) must be small. This is just
what is accomplished by g©(y), since when g(y) is steep, dx/dy = g©(y)
is small.

Appendix 3.2
Derivations of the Disequilibrium Likelihood Function

We derive the disequilibrium model©s likelihood function for two
cases: (1) errors are uncorrelated over time; and (2) errors in the wage
and price equations are serially correlated.
1 . The Basic Model. For the sake of simplifying the notation , Dt ,
St, wt , pt will denote in this appendix the natural logarithm of demand,
supply, nominal wage and price, respectively. Ut denotes the measured
unemployment rate and Zit , z2t , z3t, z4t, z5t are linear functions of
predetermined variables and coefficients. The disequilibrium model
can then be written as
Dt = c^Wt - aipt + zu + u lt
St = Piwt - Pipt + z2t + u2t

(A3.2)

Lt = min (Dt, St)

(A3.3)

wt = 72Ut + y3pt + z3t + u3t

(A3. 4)

pt = 62wt + z4t + u4t

(A3. 5)

Dt - St = \i/Ut - Ut + z5t + u5t

(A3. 6)

where
a4t
z2t = Po + Pi n(l-8t) +
Zst = To
AUNIONt

t + Ps UNIONt
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241 = &o + 5ipt_i - (52 -83)wt_! - 53wt_2 +
54( nPFt - nPFt_ 1 ) + 85t
z5t = 0.
Assuming that Ui t, . . . ,u5t are jointly normal with mean vector zero
and diagonal covariance matrix, the joint probability density function
of (Dt, St, wt, pt, Ut) is
f(Dt ,St,wt,pt,Ut) =

(2ir)5/2a l CT2o-3a4CT

(wt y2Ut -©Y3pt-z3t)2

exp

(pt-S2wt -z4t);

(A3.7)

where At is the Jacobian of the transformation and equals
(X/Ut + l)(l-&2"/3) - 0.1*12*2 + <*il2 + PiT>&2 - PiT2- The required
density is
h(Lt ,wt,Pt,Ut) = f f(Dt,Lt,wt,pt,Ut)dDt
JL ,

+ f f(Lt,St ,wt,pt,Ut)dSt.
JL ,

Define further
z6t = Lt - X t/Ut + Ut

(A3.8)
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Z7t = tt!Wt - aipt + Z lt
Z8t = Lt + \!/Ut - Ut
Z9t = pjWt - p!pt + Z2t

~2 ,
2
CT2 + CT5

a? +
.2,2

At =
+

°"l Z8t

Q =

22

a?

Performing the integrations indicated in (A3.7) yields
h(Lt,wt,pt,Ut) = G lt(G2tG3t + G4tG5t)
where

_
G,,=

IM

exp - 2

t -Y2Ut —y3pt -z3t)

(pt -82wt -z4t):

(2ir) 1/2CT 1 exp ,

G3t =

1

(

1
- ——(B-A2)I
2<t>?
I

1 -

(A3.9)
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1
(2TT) 1 '

1 "(Lt -z9t)2"

exp .

2

^2

1

*» vr»

(2ir) 1/2(CT2 + o-2) 1/2 ""1" '

_

CT2
1

2c|)2

(E.-C?)

1 -

= /:_L
The loglikelihood then is
L = 2 log h(Lt,wt,pt ,Ut).

(A3.10)

2. Autocorrelated Error Terms. We assume that u3t and u4t
follow first order Markov processes u3t = p3u3t_i + e3t, u4t =
P4u4t_! + e4t . Hence, denoting by Ui and ^ the vectors of errors (i =
3,4), we can write
iUi = €j i = 3,4
where

0
-Pi

0

1

R; =

_ 0

0

-Pi

1-

Transforming from the e's to the u's alters only Git. In analogy with
single equation models, the first term is unchanged except for the
introduction of (1 —p2) 1/2 into the Jacobian and of (1 — p2) into the
matching term of the exponent. In the other terms each squared
residual in the exponent is replaced by the square of that residual minus
its lagged value which has been multiplied by the matching p,.
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NOTES
1 After a 43-page discussion of macroeconomic theory, Modigliani (1944)
observes that the nature of the long-run equilibrium "is not unique since it
depends on assumptions concerning the form of the supply-of-labor sched
ule" (p. 88).
2This model is similar in spirit to the one in Quandt and Rosen (1986), but
differs in several important respects.
3An implicit assumption behind our labor model is that the variable of
interest is total hours employed. Thus, workers and hours per worker enter
multiplicatively. Feldstein (1967) and Bernanke (1984) have argued that this
assumption may be unrealistic. Perhaps, for example, increasing the number
of hours by 1 percent does not have the same impact on output as increasing
the number of workers by 1 percent. However, the complications involved in
dealing with this possibility would take us too far afield from our central
focus.
4If the underlying production function is assumed to have a constant
elasticity of substitution (CES), the coefficients in (3.2.4) can be used to solve
the following set of interdependent equations for the CES parameters: oti =
—a, (a2 + a3) = (ah + 1 — o-)/h, and a4 = —X (1 — a)/h, where cr is the
elasticity of substitution, h measures returns to scale, and X is the rate of
Hicks-neutral technological change. Although this is an interesting interpre
tation, the usefulness of (3.2.4) does not rest upon the CES specification. (See
remark (ii) in section 3.1.)
5We experimented with the more general formulation X2/(Ut — Xi) + X3 ,
and found that it did not significantly increase the explanatory power of the
model.
6More precisely, the probability that a given pair will belong to any region
of the (Uit,u2t) plane can be found by integrating f(-) over that region.
7In the probit model the variance is not separately identifiable and it is
customary to normalize it to unity.
8Although we do not linger over the individual steps of the derivation, the
likelihood function for the principal disequilibrium model of this study is
given in appendix 3.2.
9For a review of algorithms see Quandt (1983). The present study
employed various algorithms in the GQOPT package obtainable from R. E.
Quandt.

Estimating the Disequilibrium Model
4.1 Restatement of the Model
In this chapter we discuss the data, outline the estimation procedure,
and present our results. For purposes of reference we restate the model:
= a0 + a^n (Wt/Pt) + a2€n Qt
t_! + a4t + u lt
€nSt = Po + Mn (Wnt/Pt) + 02€n Ht
+ p3UNIONt + u2t
= min(€nSt, €nDt)

(4.1.1)
(4.1.2)
(4.1.3)

€nWt = 70
73 (€nPt - €nPt_,)
74 (€nPt-! - €nPt_ 2)
76AUNIONt + u3t

(4.1.4)

€nPt = 80 + S^nPt-! + 52(€nWt + Ss^nWt-! - €nWt_2)
+ 84(€nPFt - €nPFt_!) + 85t + u4t

(4.1.5)

€nDt - €n St =

- Ut + u5t
(4.1.6)
U,
All the equations (except (4.1.3)) differ from their counterparts above
by the addition of the error terms Ui, . . . ,u5 , whose joint distribution
is specified below. Appending an error term to the "min condition" is
possible in theory, but it leads to a substantial increase in computa
tional costs.
It is routine to establish that the system (minus equation (4.1.3))
43
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satisfies the necessary and sufficient conditions for identifiability in a
nonlinear system. (See Fisher 1966.)

4.2 Data
We describe here briefly the definitions of the variables. The
sources and methods of construction are detailed in appendix 4.1, and
the numbers presented in the appendix at the end of the book.
The data are annual observations on the U.S. economy for the years
1929 through 1983. Lt is total private hours worked per year expressed
in billions. The nominal gross hourly wage measured in dollars, Wt, is
formed by dividing total civilian compensation by Lt. Qt is gross
national product measured in billions of 1972 dollars. Pt is the
consumer price index, scaled so that the value in 1967 is 100.00. Ht,
the potential labor force measured in billions, is constructed by taking
the number of people between the ages of 16 and 65, and multiplying
by the average number of hours worked per person. The implicit
assumption here is that in any given year, those absent from the labor
force can potentially contribute an annual number of hours equal to the
average of those in the labor force.
The marginal net wage Wnt, is the product of the gross wage Wt and
a factor (1 - 9t), where 9t is the average marginal federal income tax rate.
Ut is the official unemployment rate as a fraction of the labor force. PFt
is the implicit rate deflator for fuel oil and coal. Finally, the unionization
rate, UNIONt, is union membership as a proportion of the labor force.

4.3 Stochastic Specification and Estimation Procedure
We assume that the error terms uit (i = 1, . . . ,5) are distributed
normally with mean zero and diagonal covariance matrix with ele
ments erf (i= 1, . . . ,5) on the main diagonal. We further assume that
E(uituiT) = 0 for i= 1, . . . ,5 and all t not equal to T, except that the
error terms in the nominal wage and price equations are serially
correlated according to first order Markov processes with coefficients
P! and p2 , respectively. Typically, serial correlation is ignored in
disequilibrium models because its presence in equations involving
latent variables tends to render the likelihood function intractable. (For
special exceptions, see Laffont and Monfort 1979, and Quandt 1982.)
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For our case, serial correlation is introduced in the two equations not
involving latent variables, which makes the likelihood complicated but
not intractable.
The general estimation strategy is as described in section 3.4. A
detailed derivation of the likelihood function is in appendix 3.2. The
likelihood functions were maximized numerically, using a variety of
optimization algorithms, also as described in section 3.4.

4.4 Parameter Estimates
The maximum likelihood estimates of the system (4.1. l)-(4.1.6) are
presented in column 1 of table 4.1 The numbers in parentheses to the
right of the coefficients are their associated t-values, i.e., the coeffi
cients divided by their asymptotic standard errors.
Consider first the demand equation. The value of cti implies that the
demand elasticity with respect to the real wage is -0.69, an estimate
within the range reported by Hamermesh (1984) in his survey of labor
demand equations. Similarly, the long run output elasticity (found by
adding a2 and a4) is about 0.80, a quite reasonable figure. The
coefficient on t, a3 , is about 0.0036, suggesting a very mild positive
trend in the demand for labor. All coefficients except the one on lagged
output are statistically significant at conventional levels.
The supply parameters also appear to be in line with a priori
notions. The elasticity of labor supply with respect to the after-tax
wage, Pi, is about 0.14. Analyses of time series data have consistently
found labor supply elasticities that are small in absolute value. The
elasticity of labor supply with respect to the potential number of hours,
P2 , is 0.67, which is lower than one would expect. Note, however, that
adding twice its standard error to fJ2 puts it near 0.90. The coefficient
on the unionization variable, p3 , is negative, lending support to the
hypothesis that unions can reduce the supply of labor. However, the
associated t-statistic is only -1.365; we shall have more to say about
this shortly.
In the nominal wage adjustment equation, as expected the coeffi
cients on lagged wages (*yi and 75), and current and lagged prices (73
and 74), are positive. The coefficient of Ut , ^2, is negative, indicating
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TABLE 4.1 Parameter Estimates in the Disequilibrium Model (t-values
in parentheses)
(1)
a0
<*i
<*2
«3

a4
Po
Pi
P2

P3
7o
7i
72
73
74

7s
76

80
81
82
83
84
85
X
Pi
p2
°"i

•^

°i
0-4
CTg

logL

-3.056
-0.6852
0.7396
0.003587
0.05781
1.995
0.1429
0.6697
-0.2918
0.2335
0.3915
-1.732
0.3801
0.5976
0.5493
-0.002625
-0.07249
0.9575
0.2509
0.1721
0.1712
0.1905
0.001340
0.2548
0.8850
3.46 X10~4
2.58 X10~ 3
1.32X10" 3
3.87X10"4
9.03 xlO~7
500.32

(2)
(-8.679)
(-20.18)
(15.76)
(2.929)
(1.848)
(2.822)
(3.873)
(6.640)
(-1.365)
(3.917)
(2.883)
(-5.197)
(2.042)
(3.024)
(4.114)
(-0.2386)
(-2.491)
(22.31)
(3.200)
(2.858)
(3.921)
(4.881)
(7.130)
(1.813)
(10.34)
(4.963)
(5.101)
(3.661)
(4.298)
(3.499)

-3.056
-0.6852
0.7396
0.003587
0.05781
1.994
0.1429
0.6697
-0.2861
0.2313
0.3883
-1.715
0.3805
0.6065
0.5534
—
-0.07249
0.9574
0.2513
0.1719
0.1713
0.1904
0.001340
0.2537
0.8828
3.46 X10~4
2.58 XKT 3
1.31xlO~ 3
3.87XKT4
9.03 X10~7
500.31

(-8.487)
(-19.77)
(12.77)
(2.816)
(1.124)
(2.036)
(2.817)
(4.895)
(-0.9568)
(3.605)
(2.440)
(-4.692)
(1.667)
(2.707)
(3.574)
—
(-2.234)
(22.31)
(2.820)
(2.583)
(3.921)
(4.532)
(7.050)
(1.441)
(10.05)
(4.961)
(5.084)
(3.372)
(4.121)
(3.499)

that a higher official unemployment rate is associated with lower
nominal wages and conversely.
The negative value of ye suggests that increases in unionization lead
to smaller nominal wages, but the t-statistic is only about —0.24.
Taken together with the weak statistical significance of f}3 in the supply
equation, this result suggests that the overall impact of unionization on
wages and prices is rather weak. Perhaps, however, either of the
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unionization variables would be more significant if the other were
omitted. In column 2 of table 4.1, we show the outcome when the
model is estimated with -y6 set equal to zero. Note that: (i) a4 and its
standard error are essentially unchanged; and (ii) the other parameter
estimates change only minimally. 1
Turning now to the price adjustment equation, we note that lagged
price has a coefficient of about 0.96. The values of 82 and 83 are
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that lagged changes in
nominal wages have a positive effect on this period's prices. The
coefficient on the percentage change in energy prices, 84 , is also
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that even after lagged
wages and prices are taken into account, energy prices exert an
independent effect on the price level. The coefficient on the time trend,
85 , is positive and significant.
Finally, we consider the vacancies-unemployment relationship. The
only parameter to be estimated here is X, whose value is about 0.0013.
The positive value is expected: When unemployment increases, the
vacancy rate decreases. We discuss below whether the magnitude of
the estimated A. is sensible.
In summary, the estimates of table 4.1 have at least a surface
plausibility. To determine whether or not they are really reasonable
requires some evidence on their implications. Such evidence is
provided in subsequent sections of this chapter. In the meantime, we
have to make a decision on what to do about the unionization variables.
Standard statistical criteria suggest that they could be excluded from
the model without significantly reducing its explanatory power.
Nevertheless, given the important academic and policy controversies
that swirl around the role of unions, a case can be made for retaining
the union variables, and finding out whether they are economically
significant in the sense of having a substantial quantitative impact upon
the economy. We have chosen the latter strategy; all subsequent results
in this chapter are based on the coefficients in column 1 of table 4.1. 2

4.5 Discussion of the Results
In this section we examine some of the implications of the parameter
estimates reported in table 4.1. Such an examination aids in determin-
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ing whether the disequilibrium model provides a useful framework for
analyzing the time series data on the U.S. labor market. It also
provides a basis for predicting the effects of certain policy variables
upon wages, prices, and unemployment.
Dynamics and Stability. A question of some interest is whether
prices and wages in the model are locally stable. That is, when there
is a small perturbation to the system, do the variables eventually settle
down to stable new values, or do the variables grow arbitrarily large or
small?
To begin, since equation (4.1.6) is nonlinear in Ut, we expand in
Taylor series about an arbitrary value U0, yielding
t = (- -

- 1) Ut + Ct

where Ct has different values for different periods but can be treated as
a constant in any one period. Solving for Ut, substituting for Dt and St
from the demand and supply equations, and then substituting the
resulting expression in equations (4.1.4) and (4.1.5), respectively,
yields
VnW,^ ;_! - €nPt_ 2)
76 AUNIONt

(4.4.1)

€nPt = 50 + S^nP^! + 82(€nWt + 53(€nWt_ 1 - €nWt_ 2)
+ 84(€nPFt - €nPFt_!) + 85t.

(4.4.2)

Stability requires that the roots of the characteristic polynomial for the
system (4.4.1), (4.4.2) lie within the unit circle. As we show in
appendix 4.2, this condition is satisfied for plausible values of U0 .
Goodness of Fit. How well does the disequilibrium model
"explain" the time series data? To explore this question, we computed
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Table 4.2 R2s for the Disequilibrium Model
€nLt

€nPt

0.945

0 .998

______€nWt
0.998

Ut
0.909

for each period the model's prediction for quantity for labor (€nLt),
price level (€nPt), nominal wage (€nWt), and official unemployment
rate (Ut). 3 For each variable, we regressed the actual on the predicted
value each period, and then computed the R2 . The results are recorded
in table 4.2. For all variables, the R2s are high. Of course, this
observation does not prove that the model is "right." After all, the
current values of €nWt and €nPt depend on their lagged values, and
given the high amount of autocorrelation in the data, any macroeconomic model with lagged dependent variables is likely to perform
well by this criterion. On the other hand, €nLt and Ut are not functions
of their past values, yet the fit is still pretty good. 4 In short, without
making too much of it, we find it comforting that the R2s are
reasonably high.
Excess Demand for Labor and Unemployment Predictions. One of
the main reasons for estimating a disequilibrium model of the labor
market is to produce estimates of excess demand. The strength of
excess demand can be measured in several ways:
(i) (€nD, — €nSt). Each period the model generates estimates of
the notional demand and supply for labor. Their difference, the
percentage excess demand for labor, provides a measure of unemploy
ment that, in theory, is superior to the official measure. For every year
we computed the model's reduced form prediction of excess demand as
follows: substitute the appropriate values of the exogenous and lagged
endogenous variables into equations (4.1.1) - (4.1.6); solve the entire
system for the jointly dependent variables; and use the result to
calculate €nDt - €nSt. 5
(ii) Simulated Average (€nD, — €nSJ. Procedure (i) amounts to
substituting exogenous and predetermined variables into the various
equations. However, in nonlinear systems, the predictions so obtained
may be misleading. Therefore, we performed some stochastic simula
tions. (See Portes, Quandt, Winter and Yeo, 1987.) The simulation
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strategy was to solve for the jointly determined variables after we
added to each structural equation a normal deviate with the same
variance as was estimated for that equation. We repeated this proce
dure 100 times for each time period, and then calculated for each
period the average excess demand over the 100 replications.
(Hi) Pr(Dt > St I Lt). Measures (i) and (ii) are essentially point
estimates of excess demand. Another issue is whether there was excess
demand at all. We therefore compute for each year the probability of
excess demand (conditional on the amount of labor). 6
(iv) Simulated Fraction of Times that Dt > St. Taking advantage
of the procedure outlined in (ii) above, we simulated the model 100
times each period, and found the fraction of times that demand
exceeded supply.
In table 4.3 we display the four measures for each year. As
expected, the values of all the indicators in 1932-1940 indicate very
substantial excess supplies. More generally, all series tell a very
similar story qualitatively. Estimated excess demand, (€nDt — €nSt),
is negative in all years except 1943-45, 1948, 1952-53, and 197980. (Note, however, that for 1979-80 the figures are essentially zero.)
In cases where the simulated average excess demand figures differ in
sign from (€nDt - €nSt); i.e., in 1946, 1951, 1954, 1956, 1979, and
1980; it is always a very small negative number versus a very small
positive number—both measures are really saying that excess demand
is about zero. The probabilities of excess demand by the two measures
show fairly substantial agreement with the patterns of excess demand
and fair agreement with one another. On the whole, the two excess
demand measures and the simulated fraction of times that Dt > St
agree better with one another than any of these agrees with
Pr{Dt > St I Lt}. A probable reason for this discrepancy is that the latter
measure is conditional on the observed Lt whereas the former three are
not. This is also the reason why Pr{Dt > St I Lt} exhibits more ones and
zeros than the simulated fraction of times that Dt > St. Since
Pr{Dt > St I Lt} uses more information in a sense, it provides a sharper
discrimination between periods of excess demand and supply, whereas
somewhat more "fuzziness" is observable in the figures on the
simulated fraction of times that Dt > St .
The last column of table 4.3 shows the official unemployment rate
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Table 4.3 Excess Demand Forecasts

€nDt - fnSt
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971

-0.220
-0.240
-0.188
-0.218
-0.176
-0.153
-0.168
-0.163
-0.137
-0.071
-0.001
0.151
0.195
0.167
-0.027
-0.054
0.005
-0.038
-0.045
-0.002
0.019
0.035
-0.010
-0.017
-0.020
-0.038
-0.059
-0.051
-0.054
-0.061
-0.056
-0.055
-0.056
-0.047
-0.029
-0.025
-0.024
-0.032
-0.045
-0.054

Simulated
fraction
Simulated
Official
of times
Average
€nDt — fnSt Pr(Dt>St ILt) that Dt>St
-0.192
-0.239
-0.214
-0.282
-0.219
-0.177
-0.182
-0.186
-0.152
-0.082
-0.006
0.171
0.231
0.240
0.034
-0.011
0.058
-0.012
-0.030
0.027
0.062
0.089
0.022
-0.006
0.019
-0.021
-0.042
-0.040
-0.041
-0.051
-0.045
-0.046
-0.046
-0.041
-0.015
-0.015
-0.007
-0.028
-0.033
-0.049

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.96
1.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.01
0.40
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.70
0.29
0.89
0.30
0.18
0.68
0.88
0.96
0.68
0.41
0.64
0.25
0.12
0.12
0.11
0.09
0.10
0.08
0.06
0.10
0.30
0.27
0.42
0.17
0.15
0.06

0.236
0.249
0.217
0.201
0.169
0.143
0.190
0.172
0.146
0.099
0.047
0.019
0.012
0.019
0.039
0.039
0.038
0.059
0.053
0.033
0.030
0.029
0.055
0.044
0.041
0.043
0.068
0.055
0.055
0.067
0.055
0.057
0.052
0.045
0.038
0.038
0.036
0.035
0.049
0.059
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Table 4.3 Excess Demand Forecasts, (continued)
Simulated
Simulated
fraction
Average
of times
Official
€nDj — InSt €nDt — InSt Pr(Dt>St ILt) that Dt>St
ut
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

-0.057
-0.042
-0.030
-0.009
-0.050
-0.037
-0.027
0.005
0.001
-0.005
-0.034
-0.067

-0.056
-0.047
-0.041
-0.011
-0.062
-0.053
-0.042
-0.003
-0.005
-0.019
-0.051
-0.099

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.03
0.05
0.12
0.37
0.03
0.07
0.14
0.44
0.41
0.29
0.03
0.0

0.056
0.049
0.056
0.085
0.077
0.071
0.061
0.058
0.071
0.076
0.097
0.096

for each year. There may be a tendency to judge the excess demand
figures in the first two columns by how close they correspond to the Ut
series in the last column. Although we do expect some similarities in
the movements of excess demand and official unemployment, it must
be recalled that they are probably measuring quite distinct things. (See
the discussion of the vacancies equation in section 3.2 above.) It seems
to us that the excess demand figures correspond more closely to the
standard theoretical notions of "unemployment" than do the official
unemployment rate numbers.
' 'Phillips Curve''. What does our model imply about the short run
trade-off between official unemployment and wage inflation? Of
course, these two variables are jointly determined, so it does not make
sense simply to plug in the value of one and find the implied value of
the other. Instead, we consider how both would move under alternative
aggregate demand policies. Specifically, the exogenous values of the
model except output (Qt) are set equal to their 1982 values. We then
substitute a number of hypothetical values for Qi982 into the system,
some higher than the actual value in 1982, and some lower. For every
value of Qi982» the model is solved to find the associated values of
and (€n Wi982 - €nW1981 ). This procedure allows us to examine
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how wage inflation and unemployment jointly vary under alternative
aggregate demand conditions.
The results represent an almost linear relationship characterized by
the equation (€n Wi982 - €n W198 i) = 0.187 - 1.84 Ui98 i. To attain
a nominal wage growth of only 3.5 percent would require an official
unemployment rate of 8.3 percent. Alternatively, if the official
unemployment rate were 3.5 percent, one would expect nominal wage
growth of 12.3 percent. The (approximate) equations for the Phillips
curve for other recent years are very similar.
Four points should be made regarding our Phillips Curve experi
ments:
(i) They say nothing about whether monetary or fiscal policy is
more effective in bringing about changes in unemployment and
inflation. This is because in our model the level of output drives
changes in unemployment and inflation, and output is exogenous.
Presumably, a discussion of the relative efficacy of monetary and fiscal
policies requires a model in which output is endogenous and influ
enced by government macroeconomic policy. Having said this, we
hasten to add that it is still quite interesting from a policy point of view
to see how unemployment and inflation will react to changes in output,
however the latter is determined.
(ii) The conceptual experiment behind these calculations concerns
the short run trade-off between the unemployment rate and the
percentage increase in nominal wages. It is now widely agreed that in
the long run, the rate of unemployment is independent of the inflation
rate. Although we considered imposing this constraint on the model,
we ultimately decided that a better strategy would be to let the data
determine the coefficients, and to refrain from giving these estimates
a long run interpretation.
(Hi) Our estimate of -1.84 for the slope coefficient of the Phillips
Curve is rather greater in absolute value than typical econometric
estimates, which center around —0.4. These "standard" results are
obtained by estimating time series regressions. As such, they may be
influenced by structural changes in the economy over time. In contrast,
our Phillips Curve estimate is formed on the basis of hypothetical
changes in aggregate demand within a given year.
(iv) Since we estimate our Phillips Curve by simulating the response
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to changes in Qt, a by-product of our calculations is an estimate of the
relationship between percentage changes in the real level of output and
the rate of unemployment. That is, we can estimate the parameter £ in
the equation £ AUt = A€nQt. According to "Okun's Law," £ =
—2.5. Given the nonlinear structure of our model, the value of £
depends on where Ut and Qt are evaluated. For low values of Ut
(around 0.02), we find £ = -9.29; for medium values of Ut (around
0.05), £ = -3.70; and for high values of Ut (around 0.11), £ =
—2.57. Interestingly, then, for high unemployment rates, our estimate
matches Okun's. Note also that according to these estimates of £, a
given percentage increase in aggregate demand has a greater impact on
Ut at high levels of unemployment than at low levels. This is consistent
with a kind of "diminishing returns" to eliminating unemployment.
' 'Natural Rate of Unemployment. ' ' Closely related to the Phillips
Curve is the "natural rate of unemployment" —the official rate of
unemployment that is compatible with constant growth of prices and
nominal wages. We impose a constant rate of inflation by requiring
(€nPt - €nPt_0 = (€nWt - €nWt_!) = G in equations (4.1.4) and
(4.1.5), where G is a constant. 7 Appendix 4.3 proves that the official
rate of unemployment compatible with these conditions, Uf1 , is the
positive root of the equation AUf -I- BUt - X = 0, where
A =
1 - 7i - 7s

B =((*!- PJ) (W - P) + z lt - z2t;
P = [80 + 0(82 + 83-8!) + S^nPFt-fnPFt.j) +
W = fro + GCY3 + 74 -7i -275)]/(l-7i -7s)-

(4-4.3)

In some macroeconomic models, Uf1 is required to be independent
of the value of G. That requirement is not imposed here, so we
computed Uf* for two values of G, 0.0 and 0.05. We evaluated (4.4.3)
for each year in the sample period and found that when G = 0.0, the
average value of Uf4 is 13.0 percent, and when G = 0.05, its average
value is 5.6 percent. The annual values of Uf1 conditional on G = 0.05
are reported in the first column of table 4.4. The values of Uf1 in the
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Table 4.4 Natural Unemployment Rates and Vacancy Rates

Year

Natural Unemployment Rate
(G = 0.05)

Vacancy Rate

1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973

0.0372
0.0627
0.0958
0.0611
0.0721
0.0692
0.0625
0.0573
0.0719
0.0719
0.0764
0.0626
0.0485
0.0381
0.0669
0.0944
0.103
0.0465
0.0532
0.0537
0.0427
0.0467
0.0373
0.0391
0.0467
0.0525
0.0289
0.0379
0.0247
0.0463
0.0301
0.0364
0.0194
0.0342
0.0344
0.0348
0.0337
0.0299
0.0356
0.0440
0.0225
0.0714

0.00591
0.00547
0.00687
0.00599
0.00729
0.00832
0.00761
0.00783
0.00914
0.0155
0.0360
0.160
0.202
0.175
0.0254
0.0184
0.0392
0.0222
0.0205
0.0357
0.0472
0.0578
0.0321
0.0289
0.0279
0.0223
0.0176
0.0192
0.0184
0.0171
0.0181
0.0183
0.0181
0.0201
0.0247
0.0261
0.0266
0.0238
0.0205
0.0184
0.0180
0.0212
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Table 4.4 Natural Unemployment Rates and Vacancy Rates (continued)
Year

Natural Unemployment Rate
(G = 0.05)

Vacancy Rate

1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

0.198
0.0459
0.0449
0.0635
0.0350
0.130
0.141
0.0906
0.143
0.00417

0.0246
0.0325
0.0194
0.0226
0.0254
0.0394
0.0372
0.0344
0.0234
0.0162

table exhibit substantial year-to-year variability (from a high of 19.8
percent in 1974 to 0.42 percent in 1983). There appears to be some
tendency for declining values of Uf1 from the Great Depression through
1974. After 1974, the values fluctuate somewhat erratically.
A related question is what level of official unemployment would be
associated with "true" zero excess demand in the labor market—
(Dt — St) = 0. To compute this figure, we simply note from equation
(4.1.6) that when Dt = St, X/Ut - Ut = 0, and find the Ut that satisfies
this relationship. According to this calculation, when official unem
ployment is about 3.7 percent, the labor market is actually in
equilibrium.
Vacancy Rates. Recall equation (3.2.11), the relationship between
the unobserved vacancy rate (Vt), the observed official unemployment
rate (Ut), and the parameter X : Vt = X/Ut . Another indicator of the
plausibility of our model is whether the magnitudes of the implied
values of the vacancy rate are reasonable. To investigate this issue,
note from equation (4.1.6) that vacancies are equal to excess demand
plus the official unemployment rate. We can therefore substitute our
estimates of Dt , St and Ut into (4.1.6) to calculate Vt. 8 Given the
simple inverse relationship posited between Ut and Vt, we know that
Vt will be relatively low during the depression, high during World War
II, etc. What is reassuring about the results in the second column of
Table 4.4 is that the absolute magnitudes seem quite reasonable,
something that is not guaranteed by the mere fact that X > 0.
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Table 4.5 Impact of Changing the Unionization Rate
Unionization rate
0.268
0.218
0.168
0.118
0.068

€nD-€nS

U

A€nW

A€nP

-0.018
-0.026
-0.033
-0.042
-0.049

0.046
0.052
0.057
0.063
0.069

0.057
0.046
0.036
0.025
0.014

0.047
0.045
0.042
0.039
0.036

Specifically, from 1932 to 1940, the estimated vacancy rate is less than
1 percent, during 1943-45 it rises as high as 20 percent, and varies
between 1.6 and 5.8 percent thereafter.
Impact of Unionization. As noted earlier, the unionization vari
ables in our model are not significant according to standard statistical
criteria. Nevertheless, given the importance that unionization has in
debates over public policy, we thought that it would be useful to
investigate the quantitative significance of the unionization variables.
To do so, we performed two sets of simulations:
(i) We computed for 1982 the model's predictions for excess
demand (€nD—€nS), official unemployment (U), nominal wage infla
tion (A€nW) and price level growth (A€nP) under several hypothetical
values of the unionization rate. 9 (The actual rate in 1982 was 16.8
percent.) The results are summarized in table 4.5. The main message
conveyed by the table is that unionization simply does not have much
of a quantitative impact on key macroeconomic variables. For exam
ple, a massive change in the unionization rate, from about 12 to 22
percent, would have just slightly more than a 1 percentage point effect
on the official employment rate. Curiously, to the extent there is an
effect of increasing unionization, it is to reduce both excess supply and
the official unemployment rate. To understand this counter-intuitive
result, recall that in the notional labor supply equation (4.1.2), when
UNIONt increases, the supply curve shifts inward, tending to reduce
the gap between quantity demanded and quantity supplied at any given
wage, i.e., decreasing the excess supply of labor. (This effect is
reinforced by the negative coefficient on the change in unionism in
equation (4.1.4), but that coefficient is very small.) Again, however,
we must stress that this phenomenon is quantitatively small.
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Table 4.6 Phillips Curves With Alternative Unionization Rates

Unionization rate
0.268
0.218
0.168
0.118
0.068

Intercept

Slope

0.188
0.187
0.187
0.186
0.185

-1.85
-1.85
-1.84
-1.83
-1.82

(ii) Using the method described above, we computed Phillips
Curves for 1982 under several hypothetical values of the unionization
rate. The idea here is to see how unions affect the trade-off between
unemployment and inflation—does unionization confront policymakers with a less attractive "menu" of options than would otherwise
be the case. The intercept and slope of the Phillips Curve for each
unionization rate are presented in table 4.6. They suggest that changing
rates of unionization have only imperceptible effects on the short-run
inflation-unemployment trade-off.
Impact of Income Taxes. Another important issue in current policy
debates is the impact of taxes—how do they affect labor supply,
unemployment, wages, etc. In our model, the federal personal income
tax rate directly influences the supply of labor, equation (4.1.2),
because labor supplied depends upon the net wage. To assess the
immediate impact of changing tax policy, we computed for a variety of
tax rates the model's predictions for excess demand (€nDt —€nSt),
official unemployment (U), and the rates of wage inflation (A€nW)
and price inflation (A€nP). Before considering the results of this
experiment, it is important to note again that these calculations are
done conditional on the actual level of output. Thus, they have nothing
to say about whether tax policy is a successful way of influencing the
labor market via aggregate demand.
With this caveat in mind, consider the results reported in table 4.7.
The various values of the average marginal tax rate, 6, are in the first
column. (The actual value in 1982 was 0.204.) Reading down the
column headed €nD—cnS, we see that excess supply falls as the tax
rate increases. Intuitively, this makes sense, because an increase in the
tax rate in effect shifts the supply curve in, reducing the discrepancy
A

A
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between quantity demanded and quantity supplied, ceteris paribus.
From the column headed U, we see that official unemployment rates
also fall as the tax rate increases.
The tax-induced inward shift of the supply curve also increases the
before tax wage, as indicated by the column headed A€nWt. And from
the last column, increases in the wage generate increases in prices.
Note that the changes in prices induced by tax changes turn out to be
relatively small compared to the other changes in the table.

4.6 Summary
We have estimated the disequilibrium model consisting of equations
(4.1.1) through (4.1.6) using annual data on the U.S. economy for the
years 1929 through 1983. For the most part, the parameters seem quite
reasonable. The variables in the supply and demand equations have
coefficients that are in line with a priori notions and that are consistent
with many earlier studies. While it is more difficult to say whether the
coefficients in the other equations are reasonable, the following
observations speak in their behalf: (i) the excess demand predictions
generated by the system as a whole are convincing (strong negative
excess demand in the depression, positive excess demand during
World War II, and generally negative or slightly positive excess
demand thereafter); and (ii) the system exhibits local stability, in the
sense that when there is a small disturbance, the endogenous variables
settle down to stable new values.
The parameter estimates have a number of implications. Three of the
most striking are:
(i) There is a substantial short run trade-off between the unem
ployment rate and the rate of wage inflation. Changes in aggregate
demand policy that would increase the proportion of the labor force
that is unemployed by 1 percentage point would, in the short run,
reduce the rate of wage growth by 1.84 percentage points.
(ii) Changes in unionization exert little discernible impact on the
magnitude of wages, prices, unemployment, etc.
(Hi) Conditional on the level of aggregate demand, changes in the
income tax rate similarly have little short-run effect on key macro-
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Table 4.7 Impact of Changing the Marginal Income Tax Rate

e

€nD-*nS

U

A€nW

A€nP

0.143
0.170
0.204
0.238
0.271

-0.039
-0.037
-0.034
-0.031
-0.027

0.061
0.060
0.057
0.055
0.052

0.028
0.032
0.036
0.041
0.045

0.040
0.041
0.042
0.043
0.044

economic variables. This is largely a consequence of the small
coefficient on the net wage in the labor supply equation.
Of course, as emphasized in chapters 1 and 2, our models are far from
the point where they should be used as the basis for formulating eco
nomic policy. Nevertheless, the results are plausible, interesting, and
demonstrate the potential of disequilibrium models as analytical tools.

Appendix 4.1
Data

This appendix describes the sources and methods of construction of
the variables in the model. Throughout, we abbreviate "National
Income and Product Accounts of the United States" as N.l.P.A.
Ht, the potential labor force in billions of hours, is the number of
civilians between the ages of 16 and 65 multiplied by the average
number of hours worked per person. The number of civilians in this
age group is calculated by taking the total population between 16 and
65 and subtracting membership in the armed forces (Economic Report
of the President 1984, pp. 253, 254).
Lt, total civilian hours worked per year expressed in billions, is total
hours minus hours worked in the military. For 1948-79, the following
procedure is used. To find hours worked in the military, compute the
ratio of the number of military workers to the total number of
government workers (N.l.P.A. 1929-1976, pp. 267-69 and N.l.P.A.
1976-1979, p. 55) and multiply by the number of hours worked by
government employees (N.l.P.A. 1929-1976, p. 271 and N.l.P.A.
1976-1979, p. 56). This gives hours worked in the military, which is
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then subtracted from total hours (N.LP.A. 1929-1976, p. 271 and
N.I.P.A. 1976-1979, p. 55).
For 1929-47, comparable data do not exist. Using a slightly
different method, we constructed in Rosen and Quandt (1978) a series
on civilian hours extending back to 1929. To splice the two series
together, for the period 1948 to 1973 we estimated a regression of the
logarithm of civilian hours as calculated above on a time trend and on
the logarithm of the Rosen-Quandt measure. The R2 was 0.992. We
then substituted values for the Rosen-Quandt measure from 19291947 into the regression equation, and used the fitted values. For
1980-83, a similar splicing procedure was used. Here we regressed
the N.I.P.A. series on data from a comparable series from the
Economic Report of the President 1984.
PFt, price deflator for fuel and coal, is from various editions of the
N.I.P.A.
Pt, the consumer price index, is from Historical Statistics of the
United States, pp. 210-11 for years prior to 1970; and from Economic
Report of the President 1984, p. 279, for years after 1970. P1967 =
100.0.
Qt, gross national product in 1972 prices, is from the Economic
Report of the President 1982, p. 234, for 1941 through 1979 and from
U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, July
1983, p. 69, for 1980 through 1983.
rt, nominal interest rate, 10 is the yield on Moody's corporate Aaa
bonds. For years up to 1970 the source is Historical Statistics of the
United States, p. 1003, for subsequent years it is Economic Report of
the President 1984, Table B-67.
UNIONt, union membership as a proportion of the total labor force,
is from Handbook of Labor Statistics, December 1980, p. 412 and
Gifford (1982).
Ut, unemployment as a percentage of the civilian laborforce, is from
Historical Statistics of the United States, p. 135 for 1929-47, and from
Economic Report of the President 1982, p. 271 for 1948-1981, and
Economic Report of the President 1984, p. 259 for 1982-83.
Wt, gross hourly nominal wage measured in dollars, is the ratio of
total civilian compensation to civilian hours worked. Total civilian
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compensation is total compensation of employees (N.I.P.A., 19291976, pp. 238-42 and N.l.P.A. 1976-1979, p. 52) minus compensa
tion of military employees (Historical Statistics of the United States,
p. 235; N.l.P.A. 1929-1976, pp. 240-42; and N.l.P.A. 1976-1979,
p. 52). The computation of civilian hours worked is described above.
Comparable data do not exist for 1980-83, but there is a CITIBASE
series on average hourly compensation for employees in the nonfarm
business sector. We spliced our series with the CITIBASE series by
means of an ordinary least squares regression of the logarithm of our
wage series on the logarithm of the CITIBASE series and a time trend.
The regression was estimated over the period 1947-79.
Qt, the average marginal tax rate, is taken from Barro and Sahasakul
(1983, p. 20) for years up to and including 1980. For 1981-83, we
splice together Barro and Sahasakul's figures with those of Clotfelter
(1984).

Appendix 4.2
Dynamics in the Disequilibrium Model

Let E be the forward operator such that Ext = xt +i. Denote the
characteristic matrix for system (4.4.1), (4.4.2) by M. Then the
elements of M are defined as follows:

1 + A/US

Ml2 -

3-

7i

1 +
7202

I + A/US

73-74

M21 = - 82E2 + (82 -83)E + 83
M22 = E2 - 8^.
The characteristic polynomial is found by taking the determinant of the
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matrix M. The polynomial's roots depend on the assumed value U0
about which the expansion is taken. They were computed for U0 =
0.01, 0.02, . . . ,0.14. For all of these cases there are three positive
roots, one negative root and two complex roots. The maximal modulus
decreases monotonically from 0.8340 for U0 = 0.01 to 0.4785 for
U0 = 0.14. The system is thus locally stable for all plausible
unemployment rates.

Appendix 4.3
Computation of the Natural Rate of Unemployment

We define the natural rate of unemployment to be that rate that is
compatible with a constant rate of price and wage inflation. Let this
rate be G; then by definition
wt - wt_! = G
Pt-pt-i = G

(A4.3.1)

for all t, where wages and prices are measured in natural logarithms.
It follows from (A4.3. 1) that the wage and price adjustment equations
(4.1.4), (4.1.5), can be written as
wt = 70
+ -y5(wt-2G) + -y6AUNIONt
Pt = S0 + S^-G) + 82G + 83G
!) + S5t,

(A4 3 2)

where we suppress the error terms and thus consider a certaintyequivalent solution.
Solving the two equations in (A4.3.2) yields
wt

-..

1 - 7i - 7s

,

1 ~ 7i ~ 7s
(A4.3.3)

8nU + 0(87Z + 8^—81)
+ 84-4 (€ntPFt -€nPFt_,) + 8<t
J

= ft.
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The demand and supply functions (4.1.1), (4.1.2) can be written in
abbreviated form as
Dt = aw - ot!pt + z lt
St = 3iwt - frpt + z2t

(A4.3.4)

where we again suppress the error terms and where z lt,z2t are functions
of coefficients and predetermined variables. For simplicity, define the
first term in the first equation of (A4.3.3) as w; i.e., w = [-y0 +
G(<V3 + <v 4 -'Yi-2'Y5)]/(l-'Y 1 -'Y5). Combining (A4.3.4) with the va
cancy equation (4.1.6) yields
(ot! - pi) wt - ((*! - P!> pt + zlt - Z2t = — - Ut .
(A4.3.5)
Ut
Substituting (A4.3.3) into (A4.3.5) and multiplying through by Ut
gives the quadratic equation

AUt2 + BtUt - X = 0

(A4.3.6)

where
A = 1 + (a *- Plh2
1— Yi— Ys
Bt = (o^-piXw-p,) + z lt - z2t .

Since A and X are positive, there can be only one positive root, which
is the natural rate of unemployment.

NOTES

Moreover, the coefficients do not change very much when unionization
variables are excluded entirely from the model. See Quandt and Rosen
(1986).
2However, the outcomes do not change substantively when the column 2
parameter values are used instead.
3This was done by substituting the appropriate values of the exogenous and
predetermined variables into (4.1.1) - (4.1.6), and solving for the endogenous
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variables. The value of Lt was the minimum of the St and Dt so generated. To
solve for Ut we: (i) solve for Dt, St, Wt, Pt in terms of Ut; (ii) substitute the
results for Dt and St in the unemployment-vacancies relation, and then (iii)
solve the resulting quadratic for Ut .
4For Lt and Ut simple second order regressions lead to about the same R2s
as those reported in table 4.2. When Lt is regressed on first and second order
lags R2 = 0.965, which is higher than its counterpart in table 4.2; for Ut the
corresponding figure is 0.905, which is lower.
5An alternative procedure is to compute E(€nDt - €nSt l€nLt). This is likely
to be more efficient than using simply (€nDt - €nSt) (Goldfeld and Quandt
1981), but is somewhat complicated to compute in the present model and will
not be pursued here.
6Pr{Dt > SJLt} is computed as the ratio G4t G5t/(G2t G3t + G4t G5t), where
the Gt's are defined in appendix 3.2. One can also compute the unconditional
probability that Dt exceeds St . This can be obtained from the reduced form as
follows. Let Dt = HU + vu, St = H2t + v2t , where HH, H2t depend only on
parameters and coefficients and VH, v2t are reduced form errors. Then the
required probability is Pr{Hi t — H2t > v2t — v lt} which can be computed once
estimated parameter values are substituted. However, in some applications the
probabilities have been found to be very close to the conditional probabilities.
(SeeBurkett 1981.)
7Under this assumption, it follows from equation (4.1.4) that Ut will
generally depend on both the level of the wage and the rate of inflation.
However, if -yi + y5 = 1, then U depends only on G, a much more plausible
result. Note from table 4.1 that the sum does appear to be quite close to unity.
8When we substitute actual rather than estimated values of the official
unemployment rate, qualitatively similar results emerge.
throughout, we use €nX to denote the prediction of the natural logarithm
of X rather than the logarithm of the prediction of X.
10The interest rate appears in the equilibrium model of chapter 5.

The Equilibrium Model
In this chapter, we specify and estimate an equilibrium model of the
labor market, and discuss its implications.

5.1 The Basic Structure
The equilibrium analysis is based on Lucas and Rapping 's (L-R)
work. However, their model is modified in order to facilitate compar
isons with the disequilibrium results of chapter 4. We now discuss the
labor demand, labor supply, unemployment and price equations in
turn.
Labor Demand. Like our equation (4.1.1), the L-R labor demand
equation is a marginal productivity condition that emerges from the
firm's cost minimization problem. The only serious difference is that
L-R include the lagged quantity of labor on the right hand side:
= a0 + a!€n(Wt/Pt) + a2€nQt + a3t +
+ uk.

(5.1.1)

Lagged labor is present to allow for the possibility of sluggish
adjustment to output changes. The time trend is intended to capture
technological change.
Labor Supply. A central feature of the equilibrium model is
inter-temporal labor supply substitution. Workers' labor supply in
period t is based not only on the current real net wage, (Wnt/Pt), but
also on the expectation of the future net wage formed in period t,
(Wn/Pt)*. (In general, we will denote expected values by an asterisk *.)
L-R do not correct wages in the supply equation for the presence of
taxes; in contrast, we assume that the net wage is relevant for labor
supply decisions. The higher the expected future wage, ceteris
67
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paribus, the less workers should choose to supply in the current period.
Hence, if the hypothesis of intertemporal labor supply substitution is
correct, (Wn/P)* should have a negative coefficient.
Similarly, with intertemporal substitution, the real interest rate
should have an impact on current labor supply decisions. The higher
the real interest rate, the greater the future value of money earned in
the present, and hence the greater inducement to work in the present.
The real interest rate is defined as the nominal interest rate rt, minus the
expected rate of inflation (€n P* - €n Pt), where P* is the expectation
of the future price level formed in period t. In short, intertemporal
labor supply substitution implies that the variable [rt — (€n P*— €n Pt)]
will have a positive coefficient in the labor supply equation.
We can summarize this discussion by writing 1
+ (Mn(Wnt/Pt) - Mn(Wn/P)t*
p3 [rt -(€nPt*-€nPt)]
+ u2t,

(5.1.2)

where Ht is the same scale variable used in the disequilibrium model. 2
As in (4.1.2), we augment (5.1.2) with a variable representing the
proportion of the workforce that is unionized. Also, we introduce some
simple dynamics by entering the lagged net wage, (Wnt-i/Pt-i).
Hence, we have
€nSt = po + Pi€n(Wnt/Pt) - p2€n(Wn/P)t*
+ Ps[rt - (€nP*-€nPt)] + p4€nHt
+ PsUNION, + p6€n(Wnt_ i/P^)
+ u2t.

(5.1.3)

Observed Quantity of Labor. In the equilibrium model, the ob
served quantity of labor, Lt, is always at the intersection of supply and
demand. Therefore
1^ = Dt = St.

(5.1.4)

Unemployment Rate. In the L-R model, unemployment occurs
when the current wage rate is less than the perceived "normal" wage
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rate. The underlying notion is that the labor force, as measured by the
government's Current Population Survey, consists of those who are
employed plus those who are unemployed but would accept work at
their normal wage. Hence, all unemployment is voluntary.
Define Lt as the labor supply at the normal net real wage and the
normal price level. L-R argue that it is natural to define the net real
wage in period t as being normal if its value is exactly what was
predicted last period. Algebraically, (Wnt/Pt) is the normal net wage if
it equals (Wn/P)*_!. Similarly, a normal price level is defined by
Pt = P*-I. Substituting these definitions into (5.1.3) (and recalling
that St = Lt), yields
)t*_ 1 - p2€n(Wn/P)t*
- (€nPt*-€nPt*_ 1 )] + MnHt
+ p5UNIONt + Mn(Wn/P)t*_2
+ u2t.

(5.1.5)

Next subtract (5.1.3) from (5.1.5):
€nLt - €nU = frtfn (W^P)^ - €n(Wnt/Pt)}

+ p6{€n(Wn/P);_ 2 - €n(Wnt_,/Pt_ 1 )}
(5.1.6)
Now observe that €nLt - €nLt is approximately the percentage
difference between normal employment and actual employment. Thus,
it is the rate of unemployment due to intertemporal labor supply
substitution.
L-R continue their derivation of the unemployment equation by
arguing that the unemployment rate is not exactly equal to
(€nLt— €nLt) because of sources of unemployment other than
intertemporal substitution, e.g., frictional unemployment. L-R posit
that the official unemployment rate, Ut, and (€n Lt— €n Lt) are related
linearly:
Ut = go + gl (€nLt - €nLt).

(5.1.7)
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Substituting (5.1.6) into (5.1.7) and appending an error term gives us
Ut = go + gi3i{^n(Wn/P)t*_ 1 - €n(Wnt/Pt)}

i/Pt-!)} + u3t.

(5.1.8)

Equation (5.1.8) differs from the unemployment equation estimated
by L-R only by the presence of the variable multiplying giPe> which is
present because lagged wages are included in our supply equation but
not in L-R's. In order to allow for the possibility that increases in the
unionization rate3 may affect unemployment, we augment equation
(5.1.8) with the variable AUNIONt = UNIONt - UNION^:
Ut = go + gi3i{€n(Wn/P);_ 1 - €n(Wnt/Pt)}
t*_ 1 - €nPt) + gip6tfn(Wn/P)t*_ 2
} + g2AUNIONt + u3t.

(5.1.9)

Note that in a steady state, all variables are at their normal values,
and AUNION is zero. Hence, in a steady state Ut is simply equal to g0,
which is purely frictional unemployment and can be interpreted as the
model's natural rate of unemployment. In other words, the long run
Phillips Curve is vertical at an unemployment rate of g0 .
Prices. In the Lucas-Rapping model, the price level is exogenous.
Given that the disequilibrium model of chapter 4 has a price equation,
it seemed to us that simply taking Pt as predetermined would handicap
the equilibrium model in any comparisons. We therefore include a
price equation similar to (4.1.5):
€nPt = 80 + MnPt-i + 82(€nWt + 83(€nWt_! - €nWt_2)
+ 84(€nPFt - €nPFt_!) + u4t ,

(5.1.10)

where, as before, PFt refers to fuel prices. We estimated a version of
(5.1.10) including a time trend (as in equation (4.1.5)), but its addition
virtually had no effect on the loglikelihood value.
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5.2 Modeling Expectations
At this point it is useful to summarize the basic equilibrium model:
= a0 + a^Wt/Pt) + a2€nQt + a3t
. + a4€nQt_! + a5€nLt_! + ult

(5.2.1)

t = po + Mn(Wnt/Pt) - Mn(Wn/P)t* + p3 [rt
- (€nP*- €nPt)] + (34€nHt + p5UNIONt
+ p6€n(Wrt_ 1/Pt_ 1 ) + u2t
Lt = St = Dt

(5.2.2)
(5.2.3)

U, = go + giPi{^n(Wn/P);_ 1 - €n(Wnt/Pt)}
+ p3gi(€nPt*_ 1 -€nPt) + gl p6{€n(Wn/P);_ 1
- ^(Wnt.^Pt-O} + g2AUNIONt + u3t

(5.2.4)

t = 80 + SjfriPt-! + 82(€nWt - €nWt_i)
+
+ 84(€nPFt -€nPFt_!) + u4t.

(5.2.5)

Glancing at equations (5.2.1) through (5.2.5), it is clear that
anticipated values of variables play a key role. What kind of process
generates expectations? Economists have not reached a consensus on
this important question. Given this continuing controversy, it would be
a mistake to prejudge the matter. Therefore, we estimate the equilib
rium model under two different expectational assumptions that have
appeared in the literature: adaptive expectations (e.g., L-R 1970) and
rational expectations (e.g., Altonji 1982). Both mechanisms and their
application to the equilibrium model are now discussed in turn.
Adaptive Expectations. Adaptive expectations means that expec
tations are revised on the basis of the most recent forecast error.
Suppose that last year an individual predicted that her wage would
increase by 6 percent this year, but this year's actual increase was 8
percent. If expectations are formed adaptively, her prediction for the
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next period will be revised upward by some fraction, t|i, of the 2
percent error. Algebraically, under adaptive expectations real wage
expectations formed in period t, (Wn/P)*, are governed by
(Wn/P)t*

(Wnt/Pt)
(5.2.6)

Following L-R, we assume that the same adjustment coefficient, \\i,
appears in the price expectations equation:
p* _
rt
*
Pt-i

(5.2.7)

Substituting equations (5.2.6) and (5.2.7) into the labor supply
equation (5.2.2), and using the Koyck transformation equation (Maddala 1977, p. 360) yields
€nLt = i|,|30 + ((^+ p3(l-i(/)(€nPt -€nPt_ 1 ) + p3rt - (^(l-il/)
+ (}4€nHt - P4(l-i|/) €nHt_!
+ P5UNIONt - p5(l-i|/)UNIONt_ 1
+ 36€n(Wnt_ ,/P,.!) - p6(l-*)€n(Wnt_ 2/Pt_ 2)
+ (1 - ili^nLj.! + (u2t - (l-v

O-

(5.2.8)

Similar substitutions into the unemployment equation (5.2.4) lead to
it^nOV^,) - €n(Wnt_ 1/Pt_ 1 )]
g2AUNIONt

- ^n(Wnt_ 2/Pt_ 2)] + (l-^U^i + (u3t - (l-^u^!). (5.2.9)
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In sum, the equilibrium system with adaptive expectations consists
of equations (5.2.1), (5.2.8), (5.2.9) and (5.2.5).
Rational Expectations. According to the theory of rational expec
tations, individuals' expectations about the future are unbiased fore
casts based on all the information available in the present. In the
context of our problem, the most elegant method for implementing this
theory is to specify models for all the exogenous variables in the
system; solve for expected prices and real net wages as functions of
these variables; substitute the relevant expressions for P* and (Wn/P)*
into the model; and estimate the entire system using maximum
likelihood methods.
In the vast majority of cases investigators have rejected this
approach because it is virtually intractable. Instead, a compromise
method is employed. Define as Xt the variable whose expectation we
wish to include in our model. The compromise procedure involves
estimating an auxiliary forecasting model by regressing Xt on a number
of predetermined variables, and defining X* as the forecast generated
by that model. Implementation of this procedure requires that several
questions be addressed:
(i) What variables should be used in the auxiliary forecasting
model? Altonji (1982) includes lagged values of Xt , and lagged values
of other exogenous variables as well. A major problem with this
approach is that it requires that forecasting equations for each
exogenous variable be constructed. An alternative approach is to
estimate a univariate autoregression, i.e., the equation for Xt includes
only lagged values of X. The informational and computational burden
of this approach is much lighter. In our case, preliminary experiments
indicated that for both €n(Wnt/Pt) and €nPt, second order autoregressions generally produced very high R2s. We therefore concluded that
adding more variables would not contribute much to the explanatory
power of the forecasting equations, and settled on second order
autoregressions.
(ii) What sample period should be used to estimate the auxiliary
models? One common practice is to estimate the equation for Xt using
exactly the same sample as that used to estimate the model as a whole.
(See, e.g., Pagan 1984.) Thus, if the basic model is estimated using
data for 1929 to 1983, then the forecasting model is estimated over the

74 The Conflict Between Equilibrium and Disequilibrium Theories

same period. This approach has two striking implications: (a) people in
1929 base their forecasts for 1930 on a model estimated with data
which come in part from the period 1931-1983; and (b) the processes
that generate people's expectations in 1929 and 1983 are identical.
An alternative approach with less unpalatable implications is to
employ a "rolling regression" method. Here a separate auxiliary
equation for Xt is estimated each period, using only data available in
year t. Thus, the structure generating expectations is allowed to change
each year, and one never has to assume that people based their
expectations on data that were unavailable to them. After some
preliminary experimentation, we implemented a rolling regression
procedure using 27 years worth of data. That is, the second order
autoregressions used to generate forecasts in 1929 were estimated
using data from 1902 to 1928; the forecast equations for 1930 were
estimated using data from 1903 to 1929; etc.
(iii) How far into the future must forecasts be made? X* is defined
as the expectation of "future" Xt, but this begs the question of how
many years into the future are relevant. If more than one year is
relevant, what weights should be applied to the various years in order
to form X*? Altonji (1982, p. 819) reports that for prices and real
wages, substantive outcomes are essentially unchanged when different
reasonable assumptions are employed. We therefore choose one of the
simplest procedures, to form X* as l/2(Xt+ i + Xt+2), where Xt+i is
the i period ahead forecast generated by the auxiliary equation
estimated for period t.
In summary, our implementation of rational expectations involves
the following procedure: To form €n(Wn/P)t* and €nP* estimate
€n(WnT/PT) = aot
+ a2t€n (WnT_ 2/PT_ 2) + UWT (5.2.10)
and
= b0t + blt€nPT_! + b2t€nPT_2 + u

(5.2.11)

for T = [( t— 27), (t — 26) , . . . , (t — 1)], where UWT and u^ are
random errors. This notation indicates that: (i) the parameter values
depend on the year t in which the prediction is being made; and (ii)
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year t's parameters are estimated using data going backwards from
year (t — 1) to year (t—27). Denote by () the estimated values of the
parameters in (5.2.10) and (5.2.11). Now define E€n(Wn/P)t+i as the
i period ahead forecast generated by the a's of (5.2.10), and E€nPt +i
as the i period ahead forecast generated by the b's of equation (5.2.11).
Then
A

€n(Wn/P)t* = V2 [E€n(Wn/P)t+1 + E€n(Wn/P)t+2] (5.2.12)
and
€nPt* = 1/2 [E€nPt+1 + E€nPt+2].

(5.2.13)

An Econometric Caveat. Once the series for €n(Wn/P)* and €nP*
are computed, there is a tendency to think of them as "data" just like
the other right hand side variables. Pagan (1984) and others have
demonstrated that this is an error: because the expectations are
generated by an auxiliary regression, they are subject to error, and this
fact should be taken into account in estimation.
When the auxiliary equations are estimated using the same sample as
the structural equations, it can be shown, in many cases, that failure to
take into account the fact that the expectational variables are measured
with error leads to their standard errors being biased downward—the
expectational variables appear more "significant" than they really are.
For such situations, formulas for obtaining correct errors have been
obtained. (See Pagan 1984.) However, the statistical theory required to
make such corrections in a "rolling regression" framework has not yet
developed; the complexity of the problem may very well mean that a
practical solution will be hard to find.
Where does this leave us? We think that the sensible approach is to
continue to estimate models with expectational variables where theory
indicates that it is appropriate to do so. However, the standard errors
on the expectational variables must be regarded with special caution.
Actually, this problem is less novel than it may first appear. After all,
it is well known that a host of problems—errors in variables, omitted
variables, incorrect assumptions on the error structure, etc.—may lead
to biased standard errors. Applied econometricians should always
present their results with some humility.

76 The Conflict Between Equilibrium and Disequilibrium Theories

5.3 Parameter Estimates
In this section, we first discuss the results when the equilibrium
model is estimated under the assumption of adaptive expectations, and
then turn to the rational expectations version. In every case, all
elements of the variance-covariance matrix of the error terms are
estimated, because preliminary analysis indicated that the hypothesis
that the off-diagonal terms are zero was rejected by the data.
The equilibrium models are estimated using the same data as the
disequilibrium model; see appendix 4.1 for a description.
Adaptive Expectations. The adaptive expectations equilibrium
model consists of equations (5.2.1), (5.2.8), (5.2.9) and (5.2.5). To
begin, however, we estimated the system without the price equation
(5.2.5), in order to make the results more directly comparable to L-R,
who took price to be exogenous.
When we executed the numerical maximizing procedures described
in chapter 3, the algorithm failed to converge. Moreover, some of the
parameters appeared to be heading for absurd values. Generally, such
behavior is a consequence of a very flat likelihood function. There
simply is not enough information in the data to estimate all the
parameters. This problem cannot be "solved," but one way to deal
with it is to specify some parameters a priori, thus relieving part of the
burden on the data. Rather than totally abandon the equilibrium model,
we decided to follow this tack. Specifically, we chose to condition
estimation on some value of gi. What is a reasonable value for this
parameter? Recall from equation (5.1.7) that g! shows the relationship
between measured unemployment and unemployment due to intertemporal substitution. It seemed reasonable to assume that the two types of
employment would move on a one-to-one basis; thus we set g! = 1.0.
However, as noted below, we did some experiments with some other
values as well.
The results are reported in the first column of table 5.1. The demand
coefficients are of reasonable signs and magnitudes, more or less
comparable to their counterparts in the disequilibrium model. The
supply equation estimates are at least somewhat encouraging for the
intertemporal substitution hypothesis: (a) positive values of P! and f}2
indicate that current hours of work increase with the current wage and
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TABLE 5.1 The Adaptive Expectations Model*

(1)
<*o
al
a2
<*3

a4
a5
Po

Pi

P2

Ps

P4

Ps
Pe
go
gi
g2

80
Si
82
83
84
\\i
€nL

-0.975
-0.773
0.437
0.00383
-0.173
0.606
-3.892
1.005
2.862
-0.00232
0.0754
-0.0561
-0.0361
-1.863
1.0
0.117
—
—
—
—
—
-0.0119
497.5

(2.615)
(2.682)
(8.006)
(2.775)
(-2.081)
(3.442)
(-2.632)
(4.769)
(10.37)
(-0.808)
(1.456)
(-3.434)
(-0.428)
(-3.416)
—
(1.363)
—
—
—
—
—
(-15.01)

(2)
-0.6090
-0.1371
0.4089
0.001315
-0.2587
0.8081
4.696
1.232
1.486
-0.001055
-0.006552
-0.05360
0.03114
-0.8720
1.0
0.1085
-0.08058
1.019
1.015
0.2552
0.1642
-0.03267
652.9

(-3.368)
(-2.996)
(14.21)
(1.961)
(-5.834)
(10.35)
(8.626)
(3.890)
(4.563)
(-0.6094)
(-0.2029)
(-0.5719)
(0.1728)
(-2.870)
—
(1.557)
(-3.384)
(184.4)
(1.001)
(4.054)
(4.513)
(-6.476)

*Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.

decrease with the expected future wage; and (b) the long run elasticity
of labor supply with respect to the net wage, Pi - (32 + Pe> is -1.89,
a figure which is considerably lower than most findings in the
literature, but not outlandish. However, contrary to the intertemporal
substitution hypothesis, the coefficient on the real interest rate, (33 , is
negative, although it is statistically insignificant. It is also disturbing
that the coefficient on the scale variable, p4, is only 0.07.
But the real problem in column 1 is the estimate of i|i, which
measures the extent to which the most recent forecasting error is used
to modify current expectations. It is negative, and exceeds its standard
error by a factor of 15. This makes no sense at all and implies that the
adaptive expectations model is simply not a useful way to characterize
the data.
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The results in column 2 of table 5.1 show that the situation is not
improved when we allow for endogenous price determination. A
comparison of the loglikelihoods in columns 1 and 2 indicates that the
price equation contributes significantly to the explanatory power of the
equilibrium model. But the value of ij; is still negative and statistically
significant. This result also obtained when the results were corrected
for autocorrelation, and when several reasonable alternative values of
g! were imposed. We are forced to reject the adaptive expectations
model.
Rational Expectations. The rational expectations equilibrium
model consists of equations (5.2.1) through (5.2.5) with (Wn/P)t* and
P* defined by equations (5.2.12) and (5.2.13), respectively. Our first
attempt to estimate the parameters met the same fate as the adaptive
expectations model—there was insufficient information in the data to
identify all the parameters. We again estimated conditional on
gi = 1.0.
The results are presented in column 1 of table 5.2. The demand side
results are sensible except for the negative coefficient on lagged labor
(a5), but it is statistically insignificant. The supply side results look
quite promising for the intertemporal substitution hypothesis: pi, p2
and (33 each have the expected positive signs; the long run labor supply
elasticity, Px — (32 + 3e is 0.089, result which is consistent with much
earlier work; and the coefficient on the scale variable, fJ4 , is 0.290, a
figure which seems low but not absurd. The natural rate of unemploy
ment, measured by go, is 0.0745, which seems quite reasonable. The
coefficient g2 , which multiplies the change in the unionization rate in
the unemployment equation, is positive but insignificant; this is not
very different from the corresponding result in the disequilibrium
model. Finally, as expected, the values of §i through 84 are positive.
A potentially disturbing result is that the coefficient on lagged price in
the price equation, 81, exceeds one. This raises doubts about the
stability of the model. Of course, to analyze the stability of a system
requires that all the coefficients be studied jointly; we return to this
issue later.
In contrast to the adaptive expectations results, we were sufficiently
encouraged by the figures in column 1 that we decided to attempt some
refinements. To begin, we re-estimated the system under the assump-
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TABLE 5.2 The Rational Expectations Model*
(1)
-I. 928 (-3 .280)
-0. 758 (-8 .251)
(6 .566)
0. 561
(4 .848)
0.,0121
(1 .429)
0. 100
-0. 159 (-1 .222)
(5 .620)
3.,631
(1 .942)
0.,122
(1 .129)
0,,0803
(4 .577)
0.,0231
(2 .584)
0.,290
-0,,232 (-1 .081)
(1 .235)
0,,0474
0 .0745 (10 .06)
1,,0
(1 .809)
0,,553
-0,.0512 (-1 .347)
1..013 (117 •0)
(0 .528)
0 .0556
(2 .281)
0,.187
(4 .846)
0,.235

(2)

0 .3406
-0 .8307
0 .1421
a2
0 .02983
a3
0 .1181
«4
-0 .2507
<*5
3 .9803
Po
0 .01995
Pi
-0 .01823
P2
0 .01585
P3
0 .2339
P4
-0 .2847
Ps
0.03405
P6
0 .0544
go
1 .0
gl
.04770
0
g2
-0 .06340
So
1 .023
81
-0 .3970
S2
0 .1694
53
0 .2820
84
0 .8780
Pi
.9225
0
P2
.9225
0
P3
0 .2388
P4
612 .78
€nL 522,.0
*Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.

<*0

al

(0 .3020)
(-5 .794)
.108)
(6 .276)
(1 .421)
(-1 .871)
(11 .29)
(-0(0 .9204)
.5666)
(3 .648)
(4 .666)
(-1 .085)
(1 .839)
(2 .441)
—
(0 .4962)
(-0 .8305)
(54 .11)
(-1 .413)
(1 .312)
(3 .331)
(18 .38)
(20 .82)
(27 .98)
(1 .563)
—

a

(3)
-1. 200 (-2.300)
-2. 611 (-3.367)
0. 912
(2.955)
(5.517)
0,,0437
(3.045)
0. 518
-0.,769
(3.658)
(11.65)
4.,240
0,,0490 (1.483)
-0,.0283 (-1.011)
(3.862)
0.,0157
0,.239
(4.978)
-0,.181 (-0.684)
0,.101
(3.333)
(1.080)
0 .0356
—
0..4
-0 .0898 (-0.832)
(0.340)
0 .0252
1 .036 (42.25)
-5 .842
(2.043)
2,.501
(2.230)
(2.515)
1 .549
(33.01)
0 .971
(19.68)
0 .866
0 .960 (40.22)
-0 .0738 (-0.762)
—
617 .6

tion that the errors are autocorrelated. Specifically, define pi, p2 , pa
and p4 as the first order autocorrelation coefficients in the demand,
supply, unemployment and price equations, respectively. The esti
mated p's along with other coefficients are presented in column 2 of
table 5.2.
Comparing the loglikelihood values for the models in columns 1 and
2, it is clear that the data reject the model with no autocorrelation since
under the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation, -2 times the loglike
lihood ratio has asymptotically x2 distribution with 4 degrees of
freedom. A further interesting result is that the column 2 results are
much less favorable to the intertemporal substitution hypothesis: Pi is
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still positive but is estimated imprecisely; and (32 is now negative,
albeit with a t-statistic of only —0.5666. (Remember, however, the
earlier caveat about the interpretation of the standard errors.)
Recall that the estimates in table 5.2 are conditioned upon g = 1.0.
Perhaps the results would be more favorable to the equilibrium
hypothesis under alternative values. We experimented with g! = 0.8,
0.6 and 0.4. In all cases, the results are qualitatively similar to those
with gj = 1.0. For purposes of illustration, we record the values for
g! = 0.4 in column 3 of table 5.2.
How do our findings on the equilibrium model square with earlier
studies? Altonji (1982) also tested a rational expectations formulation
of the L-R model and concluded: "The results do not support the
intertemporal substitution model. For most specifications, the current
real wage, the expected future wage, and the expected real rate of
interest are either insignificantly related to unemployment and labour
supply or have the wrong sign" (p. 784). Our results are broadly
similar. p! has the "right" sign but is statistically insignificant; p2 has
the "wrong" insignificant sign; only p3 has a "right" and significant
sign. However, these results can be obtained only after g! is forced to
have the "right" sign and magnitude. Based on the estimated
parameters, then, the equilibrium model does not seem to be a good
way of characterizing the data. We now turn to some other ways for
evaluating the model.

5.4 Other Results for the Rational Expectations Model
Stability. The analysis of stability for the equilibrium model is
somewhat less complicated than it was in the case of the disequilibrium
model. We show in appendix 5.1 that stability requires that all roots of
the following cubic equation in x have modulus less than one:
^ 1 + (33)]x3 + [-SiCon-pO - P6
3 -82) - 52P6]x2 + [P681-P6(53-S2)
- P, + P3)]x + [0653] = 0.
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Table 5.3 R2s for the Equilibrium Model
€nLt_________lnPt_________In Wt__________Ut
0.9576

0.9977

0.9989

0.8628

Solving this equation with the parameters from column 2 in table 5.2,
we find one real and one pair of complex conjugate roots given by x =
0.04988 ± 0.04795i and x = 1.0192. The complex roots produce
highly damped behavior, but the real root exceeds unity and hence the
system is not stable.
Our belief is that instability in a model should not necessarily be
regarded as a fatal flaw. After all, some observers have suggested that
the U.S. economy is prone to "inflationary spirals" when it is
subjected to shocks, and instability may just be a manifestation of this
phenomenon. Nevertheless, the finding is disturbing and creates some
doubts about the usefulness of the model.
Goodness of Fit. For every year we computed the predicted value
of each of the model's endogenous variable. When the predicted values
are regressed on the actual values, the R2s are as reported on table 5.3.
Comparing these to the R2s for the disequilibrium model (table 4.2),
we see that there is not much difference. Both models do extremely
well at tracking wages and prices, due at least in part to the high degree
of serial correlation in these series. The R2s for €nL and U are not quite
as good as those in the disequilibrium model, but neither model is
clearly superior along this dimension.
Phillips Curve. We follow the same strategy for finding the short
run Phillips Curve for the equilibrium model as we did for the
disequilibrium model: compute the values of (€n Wi982 -€n W198 i)
and Ui982 associated with various values of real output (Qi982), and fit
a straight line to the figures so generated.4 The result is
(€n W1982 -€n W1981 ) = 3.774 - 49.99 U 1982 . Recall that the
disequilibrium model yielded the result (€n Wi982 -€n W 1981 ) = 0.
1866 - 1.841 U 1982 . Hence, the equilibrium model has a much steeper
Phillips Curve—it is almost vertical at an unemployment rate of 7.5
percent. In this context, one should recall from the discussion
surrounding equation (5.1.9) that the L-R model constrains the long
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Table 5.4 Phillips Curves With Alternative Unionization Rates
Unionization rate
0.268
0.218
0.168
0.118
0.068

Intercept

Slope

3.782
3.782
3.774
3.773
3.771

-50.11
-50.10
-49.99
-49.98
-49.95

run Phillips Curve to be perfectly vertical. Apparently, given our
parameter values, this tendency is manifested in the short run as well.
Recall that in the disequilibrium model, we took advantage of the
fact that the Phillips Curve is derived by perturbing Qt to estimate the
relationship between the percentage change in output and the change in
the unemployment rate. We repeated the same exercise for the
equilibrium model, and discovered that changes in output have
virtually no impact on Ut . In light of the result in the previous
paragraph, this should come as no surprise. The equilibrium labor
market quickly adjusts to perturbations to assure that Ut stays near its
natural rate.
Unionization and the Phillips Curve. The parameters in column 2
of table 5.2 suggested that the unionization rate does not have a very
important impact on the model's endogenous variables—fJ5 and g2 are
both small relative to their standard errors. Simulations of the model
under alternative unionization rates confirm this observation. For
example, a massive change in the proportion of the labor force
unionized—from 0.268 to 0.068—affects the measured unemploy
ment rate only in the third significant figure. As in chapter 4, we also
computed Phillips Curves under alternative assumptions on the union
ization rate. The results are recorded in table 5.4. They suggest that the
unionization rate does not have much impact on the trade-off between
unemployment and the rate of nominal wage growth.
Marginal Tax Rates. Table 5.5 shows how certain key variables
are affected by changes in the marginal tax rate. The responses are all
very small. This is no surprise given that the coefficient on the net
wage in the labor supply equation (pi) is only 0.01995. (See column
2, table 5.2). Thus, for example, when the tax rate goes up, the supply
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Table 5.5 Impact of Changing the Marginal Tax Rate
Marginal tax rate
0.143
0.170
0.204
0.238
0.271

L

U

%AW

%AP

5.231
5.231
5.231
5.231
5.230

0.0736
0.0737
0.0739
0.0741
0.0743

0.0372
0.0374
0.0375
0.0377
0.0379

0.0509
0.0509
0.0508
0.0507
0.0507

curve shifts up to the left, leading to less labor transacted and higher
nominal wages. But because the supply curve is nearly vertical, the
quantitative significance of the change is very small. Why does
unemployment go up with increases in the marginal tax rate, even as
labor supply is going down? This is a consequence of the specification
of the unemployment function, equation (5.2.4). As the current net
wage falls, workers choose unemployment because they expect their
future net wage to be higher, ceterisparibus. Again, however, because
P! is small (and g! is set equal to 1.0), the quantitative significance of
this effect is low.

5.5. Evaluating the Equilibrium Models
The adaptive expectations version of the equilibrium model does not
appear to be consistent with the data in the sense that it generates
absurd estimates of the adaptive adjustment parameter. The rational
expectations model does better in the sense that at least the coefficients
with the "wrong sign" are measured imprecisely. Recall, however,
that the only way to obtain these estimates was to constrain one of the
model's coefficients to have a "reasonable" value. Otherwise, no
estimates could be obtained at all. Moreover, the fact that the model is
dynamically unstable is disturbing. On the positive side, the equilib
rium model produces a good fit to the data in the sense of high R2s
between the actual and predicted values of the endogenous variables.
But as we explained in chapter 4, this is to be expected in any
macroeconomic model with variables which trend over time. We
conclude that the equilibrium model has important deficiencies. In the
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next chapter we turn to a more careful comparison of the equilibrium
and disequilibrium models.

Appendix 5.1
Dynamics in the Equilibrium Model

In this appendix we derive conditions for stability for the model
(5. 2.1)- (5. 2. 5). We begin by rewriting the deterministic version of the
system using slightly different notation:

t-i + Z2t

(A5.1.2)

Ut = - gl p 1 €nWt - g^6€nWt-! + giMnPt-i
+ (giPi-gip3)€nP, + Z3t

(A5.1.3)

82€nWt + (^3 -^2)^Wt- l
- 83€nWt_2 + Z4t

(A5.1.4)

where
a3t + a4€nQt_i -f a5€nLt_i
-6t) - p2€n(Wn/P)t* + p3(rt -€n Pt*)
p5UNIONt + p6€n(l-0t_i)
Z3t = go - gipi€n(l-6t) + p3gi€nPt*_, + g 1 p6€n(W1/PVi
- g1 p6€n(l-e.- 1 ) + g2AUNIONt
Z4t = 80 + 84(€nPFt - €nPFt_i).
Viewing equations (A5.1.1) through (A5.1.4) as a system of
difference equations, the key thing to note is the recursive structure:
wages and prices feed into the equation that determines unemploy
ment, but the reverse is not true. Hence, in investigating the system's
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stability, we need be concerned only with (A5.1.1), (A5.1.2), and
(A5.1.4). Moreover, we can collapse (A5.1.1) and (A5.1.2) into the
single equation
Z =

+ Z2t

(A5.1.5)

The characteristic matrix M of the system (A5 .1.5) and (A5 .1.4) has
the following elements:
Mil = (ai-pOE2 - (J6E
M 12 = - (a,-p, + p3)E2 + p6E
M21 = - 82E2 - (83 -82)E + 83
M22 = E2 - 8^
where E is the forward operator.
Taking the determinant of M leads to a third degree characteristic
equation: Ax3 + Bx2 + Cx + D = 0, where
A = (cn-po - 82(01! -p! + p3)
B = - BiCon-pO - p6
C = P68! - p6(83 -82)
D = p683 .
Substituting from column 2 of table 5.2 into the expressions for A,
B, C, and D and solving the cubic equation leads to three roots:
0.04988 ± 0.04795i and 1.0192. The presence of a real root greater
than one implies that the model is unstable.
NOTES
lln some versions of their model, L-R include a wealth variable, but find
that it has the "wrong" sign. Presumably, this is because that variable is
endogenous. See Romer (1981).
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2L-R normalize labor supply by a population variable that is corrected for
changes in age and education. Implicitly, this constrains the coefficient on the
scale variable to be one. In contrast, equation (5.1.2) allows the data to
determine the coefficient on the scale variable.
3We also experimented with specifications including the level of unioniza
tion rather than its first difference, and no substantive changes occurred.
4As Lucas and Rapping point out, under the adaptive expectations
hypothesis, the unemployment equation itself has a Phillips Curve interpre
tation.

Comparing the Models
We have estimated both disequilibrium and equilibrium models of
the U.S. labor market over the period 1929-1983. The natural
question to ask at this point is, "Which one is better?" We first discuss
statistical methods for comparing the models, and then consider some
nonstatistical criteria.

6.1 Statistical Issues
From a statistical point of view, comparing the equilibrium and
disequilibrium model is far from straightforward. Generally, standard
statistical techniques can be used to compare two models only when
one of them is nested within the other, i.e., when one model imposes
certain restrictions on the parameters of the other. Our models do not
satisfy this requirement.
To get a sense of the problems involved, it is helpful to consider the
following simple "generic" disequilibrium model:
t + a2xlt + €,t

(6.1. la)

Yf = frPt + 02x2t + e2t

(6.1.1b)

Yt = min(Yp,Yf)

(6. Lie)

Pt -Pt_, = -y(Yp-Yf) + e3t,

(6.1. Id)

where Yt is quantity demanded in period t; Pt is price; x lt and x2t are
exogenous variables; and the e's are random errors. Compare model
(6.1.1) to the corresponding equilibrium model:
Y? = a;Pt + a2x lt + fji lt

(6.1.2a)

Yf = frPt + (}2x2t + n,2t

(6.1.2b)

Yf = Y?.

(6.1.2c)
87
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The primes on the parameters of (6.1.2) indicate that the estimates of
the equilibrium model are not expected to be identical to those of the
disequilibrium model.
Model (6.1.1) is not, strictly speaking, nested in (6.1.1) because one
cannot derive (6.1.2) simply by putting certain constraints on the
parameters of (6.1.1). However, an approximate test can be designed
by examining the value of l/*y from (6.1. Id). If l/y differs signifi
cantly from zero, the equilibrium model would tend to be rejected (see
Quandt 1978). Intuitively, under the equilibrium hypothesis, gaps
between quantity demanded and quantity supplied are translated into
"very large" price changes; this corresponds to a "large" value of y
and hence a "small" value of l/-y.
However, a glance at the disequilibrium and equilibrium models of
chapters 4 and 5, respectively, indicates that even this approximate
kind of test is not available to us. Of course, we could have constrained
ourselves to the class of equilibrium models that was (approximately)
nested in the disequilibrium model. But a "good" equilibrium model
might have features that cannot conveniently be included in a disequi
librium model; to exclude such features would unfairly handicap the
equilibrium model in any comparisons with the disequilibrium model.
The choice, in general, is between having fairly standard statistical
methods for choosing between models, but needing to constrain one of
the models to be not the best representative of the class, or having two
models that are, in some sense, best in their categories, but having to
do with less perfect statistical methods in the comparison. We opted
for the latter procedure. For example, in the disequilibrium model it is
computationally very hard to estimate off-diagonal terms of the
variance-covariance matrix, so these were set equal to zero. Similarly,
for computational reasons only two equations were allowed to have
autocorrelated errors. But in the equilibrium model it is fairly routine
both to estimate the off-diagonal terms and to allow all errors to be
autocorrelated, and we did so. Presumably, this gave an "advantage"
to the equilibrium model. On the other hand, in the equilibrium model,
a separate equation for nominal wages would be redundant because the
supply, demand, and price equations together determine the nominal
wage. In the disequilibrium model, this is not the case, so we included
a nominal wage equation. Here the "advantage" is for the disequili-
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brium model. One may also note that expectations are modeled
explicitly in the equilibrium model—to the extent that this is impor
tant, the apparent advantage is again with the equilibrium model
(although a skeptic might say that if we seriously misspecified the
manner in which expectations are formed, we may actually have hurt
the chances of the equilibrium model).
The benefit we hope to derive from this research strategy is that no
one can complain that the comparison between the two models is
rigged—we have attempted to give each one its best chance. But the
cost is nontrivial, because we cannot take advantage of routine
statistical methods for comparing them. We now discuss a heuristic
method of comparing the predictions of the two models.
The Hoel Test. Pesaran and Deaton (1978) have argued that in
comparing two nonnested models (hypotheses), their absolute "fit" to
the data is irrelevant; what matters is the performance of each model
when the other is taken to be the null hypothesis. When we compare
hypotheses A and B, we are really interested in the question how well
A performs relative to the data when B is assumed to be true (and, of
course, conversely). Such a comparison is meaningful and compatible
with both models "fitting" relatively poorly or exceedingly well.
Thus, a model that fits very well in absolute terms could be knocked
out of the saddle by the appearance of another model if the former
does not perform well in the light of the assumption that the latter is
true.
A reasonable heuristic test in the spirit of the Pesaran-Deaton
suggestion is provided by a procedure introduced by Hoel (1947) for
comparing the forecasting abilities of two models. In this procedure,
the predictive ability of each model is examined not in isolation, but
relative to the predictions of the other model.
More specifically, Hoel considers a single variable y for which
predictions f0t, fit are available from two hypotheses or models labeled
0 and 1 respectively. 1 Hoel's test is equivalent to estimating the
regression
yt - fot = a + P(fot-fu) + ut.
If a is nonsignificant and p is significantly positive, this is taken to be
evidence in favor of H0 against H 1? since it suggests that when the
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predictions of hypothesis 0 exceed those of hypothesis 1, reality
exceeds the predictions of hypothesis 0. In short, the hypothesis 0
predictions are statistically closer to reality than the alternative.
In the present case we have four variables: Lt, Wt , Pt , Ut , which for
symmetry of notation we denote as yit , y2t, y3t, y4t- We denote the
predictions of those variables from the equilibrium and disequilibrium
models by the superscripts e and d, respectively. Thus when equilib
rium is the null hypothesis, we have

yit - yt =

+

+

-

,4(6.1.3)

and when disequilibrium is the null, we have
=
- vd
vJit
Jit

+ Pi(y?t~yD + uu

i = i,... ,4.(6.1.4)

Equation systems (6.1.3) and (6.1.4) each represent a seemingly
unrelated regression model (Zellner 1962). Denote the ith regression in
(6.1.3) in abbreviated form as Yi = Xj<l>i + ut , where Xj is the T x
2 matrix containing a column of 1's and the column of observations on
yft ~~ yft> and where <£' = (cti fr). We can then stack the equations of
(6.1.3) as
~Xi

o"

0

0

0

X2

0

0

Y3

0

0

X3

0

Y4

_0

0

0

Xl

+u

or
Y = X4> + U.
Generalized least squares estimates are provided by <f> =
(X' ft^X^X'fl^Y, where fl is estimated from the sample vari
ances and covariances of the OLS residuals of equation (6.1.3).
Obviously, a similar GLS estimation can be performed when the roles
of e and d are interchanged.
The resulting coefficients and t-values are displayed in table 6.1.
Although the estimated a's are all insignificantly different from zero,
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Table 6.1

Results of GLS Estimation of the Hoel Test*
Null Hypothesis is
Disequilibrium

-0.000
-0.275
0.002
«2
-0.323
(*2
-0.000
«3
-0.378
P3
0.001
<*4
-0.497
P4
*t-values are in parentheses.

«i
Pi

(-0.15)
(-2.90)
(0.48)
(-3.93)
(-0.11)
(-4.05)
(0.42)
(-4.32)

Equilibrium
-0.000
-0.722
0.002
-0.687
-0.000
-0.602
0.001
-0.500

(-0.01)
(-7.73)
(0.48)
(-8.49)
(-0.13)
(-6.62)
(0.43)
(-4.36)

the estimated (3's are all negative. Thus, neither hypothesis allows the
other one to be rejected. We conclude that there is no appreciable
difference in the forecasting abilities of the two models.

6.2 Other Criteria
Ability to forecast is not the only basis for comparing models. Other
criteria must be brought to bear:
(i) Plausibility of the underlying theory. As we noted in chapters
1 and 2, there are strong ideological overtones to the equilibrium vs.
disequilibrium debate. Theoretical arguments that seem quite compel
ling to members of one camp have little appeal to members of another.
However, the notion that an event like the Great Depression can be
explained by intertemporal labor supply substitution seems incredible.
In this context it is useful to recall that the disequilibrium model
produces sensible estimates of excess demand each year (see table
4.3); implicitly, the equilibrium model sets excess demand equal to
zero each year.
(ii) Plausibility of the parameter estimates. It is rare for every
parameter in a multi-equation econometric model to be "right" in the
sense of having the expected magnitude and being estimated precisely.
As the discussions in chapters 4 and 5 indicated, neither the disequi
librium nor the equilibrium model is an exception. Both models have
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some anomalous results. However, the main problem with the dis
equilibrium model—a scale parameter in the supply equation that
seems implausibly low—pales in comparison to the problems in the
equilibrium model: (a) the scale parameter in the supply equation is
even lower than its counterpart in the disequilibrium model, (b) In the
supply equation, the coefficient on the expected future wage has a
negative sign. This rejects a key aspect of the theory underlying the
model, (c) The parameter estimates taken together imply that the
system is dynamically unstable.

6.3 Conclusion
Where does this leave us? The comparison of nonnested economet
ric models is not a straightforward matter; judging the relative merits
of such models is partly a matter of tastes—some would even say of
aesthetics. Hence, unambiguous answers cannot be obtained. Taking
all factors into consideration, however, it seems to us that the
disequilibrium model does a better job of characterizing the U.S. labor
market than its equilibrium counterpart.
Having said this, we hasten to add that the disequilibrium model is
relatively simple, and could be improved in a number of ways. For
example, output in the model is predetermined; it would clearly be
desirable to make it endogenous. (The same comment, of course,
applies to the equilibrium model.) In addition, it would be useful to
estimate a multimarket version of this model. This would allow
exploration of the possibility that market clearing goes on at different
rates in the union and nonunion sectors. The disequilibrium research
agenda is rich and varied.

NOTES
'The heuristic aspects of the test as applied here derive from the fact that
Hoel assumes fot,fi t to be given to the investigator exogenously or to represent
out-of-sample forecasts. If those conditions hold, the Hoel test is an exact
result following from the Neyman-Pearson theory of best tests.
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APPENDIX
Data

This appendix contains the data. The notation is the same as used in
the text, and the definitions are listed in appendix 4.1.
Year €nL

1929
1930
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964

4.785
4.736
4.676
4.589
4.586
4.577
4.620
4.677
4.726
4.662
4.703
4.739
4.805
4.864
4.893
4.888
4.850
4.859
4.880
4.809
4.772
4.803
4.845
4.853
4.863
4.827
4.855
4.872
4.863
4.832
4.860
4.869
4.862
4.883
4.895
4.911

€nH

€nW

€nP

€nQ

0

UNION

U

€nPF

119. 710
114. 000
107. 290
98. 440
98. 090
97. 260
101. 470
107. 470
112. 830
105. 890
110. 320
114. 290
122. 180
129. 510
133. 310
132. 700
127. 730
128.,950
131. 610
122.,640
118. 110
121.,870
127,.140
128.,100
129..440
124,,870
128,.440
130 .640
129.410
125 .400
129 .010
130 .190
129 .300
132 .060
133 .580
135 .830

-0. 857
-0. 896
-1. 001
-1. 163
-1. 210
-1. 051
-1. 008
-0. 925
-0. 865
-0. 865
-0. 839
-0. 797
-0.664
-0. 494
-0.,334
-0. 271
-0..232
-0.,157
-0.,051
0.,114
0.,144
0.,204
0..302
0.,367
0..429
0.,461
0..513
0..580
0..643
0..681
0..735
0,.781
0 .817
0 .865
0 .908
0 .961

3.938
3.912
3.820
3.711
3.658
3.691
3.716
3.726
3.761
3.742
3.728
3.738
3.786
3.888
3.947
3.965
3.987
4.069
4.203
4.278
4.268
4.278
4.354
4.376
4.383
4.388
4.385
4.399
4.434
4.461
4.469
4.485
4.495
4.506
4.519
4.532

5.731
5.627
5.547
5.386
5.367
5.454
5.548
5.677
5.729
5.677
5.759
5.841
5.992
6.135
6.276
6.344
6.329
6.170
6.153
6.194
6.199
6.282
6.362
6.398
6.436
6.423
6.488
6.510
6.528
6.523
6.582
6.603
6.629
6.685
6.724
6.776

0.10
0.10
0.10
0.20
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.40
0.40
0.80
3.80
10.70
18.40
19.40
19.40
14.50
15.30
12.10
11.90
13.10
16.40
18.10
18.30
15.90
16.40
16.70
16.90
16.70
17.20
17.20
17.40
17.70
17.90
15.60

0.0
0.068
0.065
0.060
0.052
0.059
0.067
0.074
0.129
0.146
0.158
0.155
0.177
0.172
0.205
0.214
0.219
0.236
0.239
0.231
0.227
0.223
0.245
0.242
0.255
0.254
0.247
0.252
0.249
0.242
0.241
0.236
0.223
0.226
0.222
0.222

0.032
0.087
0.159
0.236
0.249
0.217
0.201
0.169
0.143
0.190
0.172
0.146
0.099
0.047
0.019
0.012
0.019
0.039
0.039
0.038
0.059
0.053
0.033
0.030
0.029
0.055
0.044
0.041
0.043
0.068
0.055
0.055
0.067
0.055
0.057
0.052

3.742
3.723
3.664
3.561
3.523
3.584
3.561
3.578
3.592
3.586
3.572
3.603
3.648
3.721
3.780
3.811
3.816
3.869
3.989
4.138
4.143
4.171
4.211
4.225
4.254
4.257
4.268
4.301
4.352
4.339
4.353
4.333
4.373
4.374
4.394
4.371
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Year €nL

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

4.943
4.977
4.985
5.004
5.029
5.015
5.016
5.044
5.082
5.084
5.055
5.081
5.116
5.159
5.190
5.207
5.216
5.182
5.199

€nH

€nW

ftiP

€nQ

0

UNION

U

€nPF

140..240
144..970
146..240
149 .010
152..810
150 .730
150..770
155 .090
161 .150
161 .410
156 .790
160 .990
166 .650
174 .010
179..520
182,.590
184 .220
178..100
181 .160

1.006
1.072
1.132
1.211
1.285
1.366
1.431
1.500
1.575
1.666
1.756
1.838
1.911
1.990
2.077
2.151
2.239
2.325
2.349

4.549
4.577
4.605
4.646
4.699
4.756
4.798
4.831
4.891
4.995
5.083
5.139
5.201
5.275
5.382
5.509
5.607
5.667
5.698

6.834
6.892
6.919
6.964
6.992
6.990
7.023
7.078
7.135
7.129
7.118
7.170
7.224
7.270
7.302
7.296
7.321
7.300
7.336

14.80
15.30
15.70
17.30
18.10
16.80
16.40
16.40
17.00
17.60
17.80
18.50
18.70
20.80
19.00
20.00
19.90
20.40
18.90

0.,224
0.,227
0.,227
0.,230
0. 226
0.,226
0. 221
0.,218
0.,218
0. 218
0..207
0..203
0. 198
0.,197
0. 186
0.,179
0.,176
0. 168
0.,159

0.045
0.038
0.038
0.036
0.035
0.049
0.059
0.056
0.049
0.056
0.085
0.077
0.071
0.061
0.058
0.071
0.076
0.097
0.096

4.392
4.419
4.450
4.481
4.503
4.540
4.600
4.605
4.743
5.206
5.286
5.357
5.479
5.531
5.831
6.154
6.349
6.338
6.275
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